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CANCEL [©OPYRIGHT] CULTURE: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF GEORGE ORWELL’S
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR
TRACY REILLY *
ABSTRACT
In this article, I present a combined legal and literary analysis of one of
the most destructive themes in contemporary intellectual property scholarship:
the putative death of the copyright author. For decades, the vast majority of
scholars in all academic disciplines have widely accepted that the conceptual
death of the author announced in 1967 by French literary theorist Roland
Barthes is today a conclusively proven fact. This piece, however, offers a
unique and unquestionably controversial challenge to such a purported
denouement: it boldly, and not without trepidation, theorizes that the true goal
of some anti-author scholars is the outright annihilation of the natural rights
principles upon which the Progress Clause of the U.S. Constitution is founded.
By examining the canonical principles apparent in George Orwell’s twentiethcentury dystopian novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, I unravel the cause, effect, and
cultural significance of the postmodern phenomenon of the death of the author.
I juxtapose universal themes explored by Orwell such as “Newspeak,”
“Doublethink” and “2+2=5” with the current social trend known as “cancel
culture,” and reveal—as Nineteen Eighty-Four’s protagonist Winston Smith
did with respect to “Big Brother”—that the true spirit of anti-author copyright
*
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rhetoric is based upon collectivist precepts that are dangerously
counterproductive to a free society. While copyright scholars routinely provide
egalitarian and altruistic justifications for killing the author—primarily for the
alleged enrichment of the public domain as a mechanism to enhance
opportunities for burgeoning new authors to have a bite at the copyright pie—
I shine the light on this deception. By drawing from the profundity of Orwell’s
rich literary tradition, which is astoundingly prescient of today’s social climate,
I reveal how the anti-author movement is a concerted power play by a band of
elitist academicians who effectively wish to “cancel” the natural rights
foundation of copyright law in favor of a socialistic leveling of originality and
individual creativity.
By 2050—earlier, probably—all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have
disappeared. The whole literature of the past will have been destroyed. Chaucer,
Shakespeare, Milton, Byron—they’ll exist only in Newspeak versions, not merely
changed into something different, but actually changed into something
contradictory of what they used to be.
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 1

1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 56 (Everyman’s Library 1949) [hereinafter
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR].
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INTRODUCTION
During the most contentious election in U.S. history between Donald
Trump and Joe Biden in 2020—and in the thick of the worldwide Covid-19
pandemic—the social media trend known as cancel culture (“Cancel
Culture”) fully exploded. 2 The movement has effectively created a social
and political chasm that continues to wedge a deep divide within the cultural
framework of the United States. Its proponents argue that Cancel Culture is
“about establishing new ethical and social norms and figuring out how to
respond collectively when those norms are violated.” 3 Conversely, critics of
this trend insist that it has “grown into erasing of history, encouraging
lawlessness, muting citizens, and violating free exchange of ideas, thoughts,
and speech.” 4 Regardless of where along the political spectrum one sits with
respect to the phenomenon of Cancel Culture, it is without doubt a byproduct
of our newfound, yet ill-advised, addiction to social media, the conveniently
anonymous platform fueling the growth of this craze.
The Merriam Webster online dictionary defines Cancel Culture in the
following manner:
to cancel someone (usually a celebrity or other well-known figure) means
to stop giving support to that person. The act of canceling could entail
boycotting an actor’s movies or no longer reading or promoting a writer’s
works. The reason for cancellation can vary, but it usually is due to the
person in question having expressed an objectionable opinion, or having
conducted themselves in a way that is unacceptable, so that continuing to
patronize that person’s work leaves a bitter taste. 5

The purpose of Cancel Culture, according to the definition, is for the targeted
person to lose “cultural cachet.” 6 It has recently become apparent, however,
that much more is at stake for those who are canceled.
Whereas Cancel Culture began rather innocuously in 2015 on Twitter—
as a joking reaction to someone who acted in a disapproving way—this social
media trend “has evolved into a weapon with the potential to ruin lives.” 7 In
the wake of Covid 19-induced social isolation, “cancelations appear to have
reached a high point,” as the practice found its way into politics, and has

2. See, e.g., ‘Cancel Culture’ and ‘QAnon’: From the 2020 Election, Some New Political Terms,
ABC7NEWS.COM, Nov. 2, 2020, https://abc7news.com/cancel-culture-qanon-2020-electionvote/7613661/ [https://perma.cc/AF4Z-XWBR].
3. Aja Romano, Why We Can’t Stop Fighting About Cancel Culture, VOX, Aug. 25, 2020,
https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/12/30/20879720/what-is-cancel-culture-explained-history-debate
[https://perma.cc/5FXG-3YA2].
4. Id.
5. MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/cancel-culture-wordswere-watching [https://perma.cc/3TK3-X4N] (last visited Nov. 11, 2020).
6. Id.
7. Tania Ortiz, Cancel Culture Gives a Toxic Power to People on the Internet, THE COUGAR
CHRONICLE (Sep. 29, 2020), https://csusmchronicle.com/20312/opinion/cancel-culture-enables-a-toxicpower-to-people-on-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/4CWX-BRQW].
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even extended to brutal online flogging of non-public individuals. 8 Notably,
those who become Cancel Culture victims are not always politicians or other
powerful people who expect to be held up to scrutiny in the public eye. They
are everyday working folks such as security guards and teachers whose
families have suffered devastating harm that is “well beyond the discomfort
of merely being disagreed with” including loss of employment, 9 reputational
damage, 10 and even loss of life. 11 Indeed, 2020 was a viscous year all
around.
The practice of boycotting businesses, movies, and even celebrities
themselves is certainly not a novel concept; however, the contemporary
Cancel Culture movement has taken such backlashing to the extreme, with
the invidious purpose of ruining lives 12 and claiming that the target never
even existed in the first place. 13 For these reasons, commentators have
observed that the phenomenon is eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1949
novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which he depicted a dystopian world where
free thought and individual speech have been entirely replaced with
censorship and groupthink handed down by a totalitarian government rule. 14
Using two-way surveillance cameras positioned in every crevice of society,
public or private, in Orwell’s fictive society of Oceania, enemies of the state
are watched, captured, and essentially wiped out by the “Thought Police;”
their entire existence is essentially eviscerated. 15
In the novel, Orwell describes those unlucky enough to be caught by
the ruling party and robbed of all their power over the material world:
8. Rachel E. Greenspan, How ‘Cancel Culture’ Quickly Became one of the Buzziest and Most
/Controversial Ideas on the Internet, INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.insider.com/cancel-culturemeaning-history-origin-phrase-used-negatively-2020-7 [https://perma.cc/85NF-TNAX] .
9. Id.
10. Zoe Thomas, What is the Cost of ‘Cancel Culture’?, BBC.COM, Oct. 8, 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54374824 [https://perma.cc/RJG4-HSV5].
11. Jess Campbell, Have We Taken Cancel Culture Too Far in 2020?, Jan. 15, 2020, GQ,
https://www.gq.com.au/success/opinions/have-we-taken-cancel-culture-too-far-in-2020/newsstory/0f12503dbf60071a63d7ffd5e29bcce7 [https://perma.cc/2ADE-A5GN ].
12. Efrem Graham, How America’s Toxic ‘Cancel Culture’ Ruins Lives and Ends Careers,
CBN.COM, Jan. 15, 2021, https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2020/september/how-americas-toxiccancel-culture-ruins-lives-and-ends-careers [https://perma.cc/VCW7-G5DH].
13. John McWorter, Academics are Really, Really Worried About Their Freedom, THE ATLANTIC
(Sep. 21, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/academics-are-really-reallyworried-about-their-freedom/615724/ [https://perma.cc/8ZVG-RSQK].
14. See, e.g., Quentin Kopp, Cancel Culture, George Orwell and Reasoned Debate,
THE GUARDIAN (July 14, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/14/cancel-culture-georgeorwell-and-reasoned-debate [https://perma.cc/9H59-8NNG]; David Winston, With Silencing of Speech,
is
America
Entering
Orwellian
Territory?,
ROLL
CALL
(July
29,
2020),
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/07/29/with-silencing-of-speech-is-america-entering-orwellian-territory/
[https://perma.cc/S7YF-HFXH]. See also, Greg Diglin, Living the Orwellian Nightmare: New Media and
Digital Dystopia, 11 E–LEARNING & DIGIT. MEDIA, 608 (2014), www.wwwords.co.uk/ELEA, (“It is my
position that 1984 can be read as an allegory for the conditions in which we presently live. I shall argue
that other elements of Orwell’s vision have now manifested in our present-day world”).
15. See ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 21 (“It was always at night—the arrests
invariably happened at night. The sudden jerk out of sleep, the rough hand shaking of your shoulder, the
lights glaring in your eyes, ring of hard faces around your bed”).
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When once you were in the grip of the Party, what you felt or did not feel,
what you did or refrained from doing, made literally no difference.
Whatever happened you vanished, and neither you nor your actions were
ever heard of again. You were lifted clean out of the stream of history. 16

Within the overall setting of the story, and similar to Cancel Culture, “there
is an absorbing sense of loss—a feeling that the world has changed, is
changing, and that the results make it a struggle to retain the slightest sense
of humanity.” 17
Clearly, Orwell seems to be on everyone’s mind these days: in 2013
after National Security Agency contractor and whistleblower Edward
Snowden revealed the immense scale of global surveillance systems
employed by U.S. and British intelligence as “Orwellian,” online sales of
Nineteen Eighty-Four increased by 5,800 percent within a week. 18 As
evidence of its enduring value and popularity, the novel reached the top of
Amazon’s list of overall best sellers at the peak of the Cancel Culture
movement in 2021; it also ranked second at the competing bookseller Barnes
& Noble among the company’s top 100 titles. 19 Such record sales of a novel
written over seventy years ago demonstrate that the fears I express in this
article are not a product of theoretical academic debate or posturing. It is
manifest evidence that people in mainstream America are very afraid. And
they should be.
Commenting on Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell once stated that he
thought the fictional tyrannical society he created in the novel would not
necessarily come into existence.20 Yet, he also famously expressed his dire
concern that it certainly may, lamenting that “totalitarian ideas have taken
root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw those
ideas out to their logical consequences.” 21 This article attempts to do the
same, specifically related to the negative influence that academic scholarship
has had upon real-world authors of copyrighted works and the free,
democratic society that makes their creation possible.
Without doubt, the merciless censorship practices of the Cancel Culture
movement have obdurately crept into all levels and areas of society, from the
pundit’s platforms to social media sites and, most especially, from behind
the professor podiums at universities across the country. 22 In this article, I
16. Id. at 172.
17. KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, BETWEEN THE BULLET AND THE LIE: ESSAYS ON ORWELL 73 (2017).
18. Id. at 1.
19. Karen Ho, George Orwell’s “1984” is Topping Amazon’s Best Sellers, QUARTZ, Jan. 13, 2021,
https://qz.com/1956937/george-orwells-1984-is-topping-amazons-best-sellers/ [https://perma.cc/FT9KY3N7].
20. Matthew Stewart, Orwell and the Cancelation of Culture, LAW & LIBERTY (Sep. 20, 2020),
https://lawliberty.org/orwell-and-the-cancellation-of-culture/ [https://perma.cc/DAK3-NF98].
21. Id.
22. Conor Friedersdorf, Evidence That Conservative Students Really Do Self-Censor, THE
ATLANTIC, Feb. 16, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/evidence-conservativestudents-really-do-self-censor/606559/ [https://perma.cc/T9C9-U64K].
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focus on one example of how Cancel Culture has begun to permeate the
university setting and acculturate students toward a deeply disturbing
collectivist mindset, which is directly contrary to our country’s history and
our constitutional system of government: the cancelation of the historic
author figure.
This article also examines how and, more importantly, why legal
academics with collectivist and even openly Marxist agendas23 have for
decades been attempting to sabotage and, in effect, cancel not only
individuals (although they have also done this), but also the entire culture
upon which the Progress Clause of the U.S. Constitution 24 and the Copyright
Act 25 is historically based. The primary method by which this “Cancel
[©opyright] Culture” sub-movement is accomplished (although there are
many) is by adopting the philosophy of the postmodernist French theorists
that the traditional notion of authorship must be exposed, deconstructed, and
condemned as a mere white-male power structure primarily intended to
eviscerate the voices of women and minorities.
This piece is the third in a series of articles in which I critically examine
the death-of-the-author (“DOA”) movement from the perspective of
copyright law. Guided by the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, José Ortega y
Gasset, Søren Kierkegaard, and Ayn Rand, in Copyright and the Tragedy of
the Common, I examined the philosophical underpinnings of the DOA
movement. There, I demonstrated how the postmodern assault on the author
results in not only a scarcity in the authorship of high-quality creative works,
but also an eventual moral downslide, or philosophical “leveling” of
culture. 26 Focusing primarily on the works of behavioral psychologists, in
Copyright and a Synergistic Society, I further established that continuing to
foster a regime of copyright rights that are exclusively held and controlled
by individual authors—as opposed to an elusive collective—will ultimately
result in more and better works, as well as contribute to a “synergistic” and
happier society overall. 27
This article analyzes the renowned literary themes in Nineteen EightyFour to continue my critical, interdisciplinary examination of the
23. See DOUGLAS MURRAY, THE MADNESS OF CROWDS: GENDER, RACE AND IDENTITY 52 (2019)
(Noting that in 2006, 18% of professors in the social sciences at universities “happily identified as
‘Marxist’”).
24. Congress has the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
25. Congress first codified exclusive rights to authors of works in the Copyright Act of 1790. See
Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §4B at 4-7 through
4-9 (1992). The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, is the current law protecting the exclusive rights of
original works to their authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006).
26. Tracy Reilly, Copyright and the Tragedy of the Common, 55 IDEA 105 (2014) [hereinafter
Tragedy].
27. Tracy Reilly, Copyright and a Synergistic Society, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 575 (2017)
[hereinafter Synergy].
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phenomenon of the dead author, among other popular copyright tropes
employed to etch away at the exclusive rights of copyright holders. I argue
here that the goal of Cancel [©opyright] Culture proponents is slowly to
introduce ideological conformities that will eventually eliminate individual
authorship, as they charmingly integrate socialist visions of groupthink,
polyvocal creation, and collective, common ownership of artistic works, all
the while attempting to convince their audience of the benevolence and
humanity of their supposedly democratic aims.
This article proceeds in five sections. In Section I, I begin with a
background discussion of the individualistic, natural rights principles
embedded in the U.S. Constitution specifically related to the creation of
literary and other artistic works as intended by our constitutional Framers,
and upon which the Copyright Act is purposed. In this section, I provide not
only the legal backdrop, but also a philosophical and historical view of the
importance of the “author” and “authorship” in copyright jurisprudence.
Section II outlines the literary development of the slow, metaphorical
death of the author, as promulgated by French theorists beginning in the
1960s and now widely accepted not only by contemporary literary critics,
but also by copyright scholars to the point where the DOA is now an
unchallenged credo. This second section demonstrates how pervasive the
DOA syndrome has become in legal circles and how, in my opinion, it has
fueled destructive mainstream movements like Cancel Culture, which
threaten the very structure upon which our republic is founded. I explain
why collectivist movements such as Cancel Culture and its progeny, the
“woke” movement, do not celebrate individual achievement and intellectual
progress as intended by the Framers. Further, I show how copyright scholars
have similarly jumped on the DOA bandwagon with the covert objective to
abrogate the individual rights of creative authors, effectively advancing an
academically inspired Cancel [©opyright] Culture movement that is
anathema to the exclusive guarantees offered to authors in the Progress
Clause.
In Section III, I summarize (with spoilers) the main objective, storyline,
themes, and characters in Nineteen Eighty-Four in order to provide the
foundation upon which I will build a comparison of Orwell’s fictional
masterpiece to the unfortunate realities of contemporary copyright law, and
the changing culture of our society. Using Orwell’s main themes in Nineteen
Eighty-Four as a backdrop, in Section IV I provide specific examples of
scholarly theories on the DOA movement in copyright law in an attempt to
analyze and decipher the deeper meanings and intentions upon which their
precepts continue to thrive in the academy.
I conclude in Section V with a warning to these intellectuals—akin to
Orwell’s cautioning in Nineteen Eighty-Four—that by killing the author and
the constitutional foundations upon which authorship was built, we are also
destined to alter the spirit and permanently kill the gestalt that guides our
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free and artistically productive society. I demonstrate how reclaiming from
academia our individual freedoms of creativity and authorship—principles
upon which our republic was founded—can restore copyright law to its
original, natural rights tenets and cancel Cancel Culture in all of its
pernicious forms.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND NATURAL RIGHTS ORIGINS OF
AUTHORSHIP

In this digitally driven world in which, with a click of a mouse, one can
conjure a vast portion of all the works of art, literature, and music ever
created and published, it may be tempting to dismiss the fact that modern
copyright law is largely responsible for making it so. From the software and
hardware we use for internet and other digital access, to the very words,
notes, and paint strokes which form the works themselves, copyright stands
ever ready to assist both those who make, and those who enjoy and use,
creative works.
Without doubt, copyright and other forms of intellectual property (IP)
law was on the minds of our Framers as they conceived and penned the
Constitution. As an incentive for individual authors to produce the literary
and other creative works that we all enjoy and learn from, the Progress
Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress the power to enact
legislation providing “Authors” with “the exclusive right” to their “writings”
for “limited times.” 28 The First Constitutional Congress was up to the task,
defining the scope of that constitutional directive by legislating the first
Copyright Act of 1790, which initially granted authors a maximum of two
fourteen-year terms of exclusive ownership and use. 29
The language of the current Copyright Act of 1976 specifically provides
that an “author” is the subject or entity in whom “[c]opyright in a work . . .
vests initially.” 30 At the expiration of the exclusive copyright term, authors
must fully relinquish all legal rights in their works, which then fall into the
commons, or the public domain, for fair and free reuse by any third party.
Due to the exclusive and monopoly-oriented, albeit legally sanctioned
and limited, nature of copyright authorship and ownership, at the heart of
every debate with respect to copyright laws is the proper theoretical
mechanism(s) by which they can fairly balance the rights of authors against

28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (affording Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”).
29. Benjamin Davidson, Lost in Translation: Distinguishing Between French and Anglo-American
Natural Rights in Literary Property, and How Dastar Proves That the Difference Still Matters, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 583, 603 (2005).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
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those of consumers and other third parties. 31 How this balance is properly
determined remains a complex question, 32 centering on sophisticated and
competing philosophies that serve to validate (or invalidate) individual
property ownership. According to Eric Claeys, whose terminology I borrow,
the scholarly debate forms two main camps: those who consider IP as a
sensible and specialized application of real property law (the “property
essentialists”) versus those who remain skeptical as to whether traditional
property concepts help institute sensible and fair IP policies (the “property
skeptics”). 33
To justify copyright exclusivity, most property essentialists tend to rely
primarily upon John Locke’s natural rights theory of property law, which
maintains that a person’s labor provides the proper foundation for claiming
property rights, including IP rights. 34 Writing in Great Britain in the
seventeenth century, Locke professed that, while God bestowed the earth
upon all humans collectively, individual persons may claim exclusive
ownership to whatever portions of that commons that their labor is “annexed
to” or “mixed with.” 35
The primary justifications for individual appropriation are twofold.
First, the only way to make proper use of the commons is for humans to take
hold, control, and labor to make use of things in the commons that will serve
to benefit human existence, otherwise such resources would go to waste. 36
Second, in a state of nature in which resources are given to all in equal
measure, there is no mechanism by which individuals receive permission to
use them “because original acquisition through common consent is
unworkable.” 37
Because all possess a natural right to the fruits of their own labors,
including the expression of their creative and other intellectual activities, the
government should ensure that no one will deprive them of what they have
earned by either force or fraud 38 or, in the case of copyright, by unauthorized
reproduction, distribution, and other entitlements of authorship. 39 Lockean
philosophy thus links the human capacity for reason to ethical individualism
31. See, e.g., J. Janewa Osei Tutu, Humanizing Intellectual Property: Moving Beyond the Natural
Rights Property Focus, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 207, 217 (2017) (“Clearly, it is essential to strike a
balance between the interests of the rights holder and the interests of the user of IP-protected goods, as
well as between the interests of the individual and the interests of the collective”).
32. Id.
33. Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and Property in IP): A Review of Justifying
Intellectual Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2012).
34. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993).
35. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 34-36 (2011).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. RANDOLPH J. MAY & SETH L. COOPER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (2015).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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and its social consequences, as well as the prohibition of force against
another’s independent judgement or action, among other rights that are
essential to a democratic society. 40
The Lockean theory greatly influenced our Framers, as “a natural rights
perspective was woven into at least part of the fabric of our constitutional
inheritance.” 41 With respect to copyright law in particular, Locke’s central
argument became a powerful message for authors because it “furnished
copyright doctrine with a ground in natural right that could justify admitting
the author. . . as the legal owner of a property in the work.” 42 In fact, property
essentialists have observed that even prior to the drafting of the Constitution
twelve colonies had adopted their own copyright statutes, many of which
specifically recognized natural rights. 43
Lockean labor theory is undoubtedly alive and well as it continues to
this day to provide a theoretical framework for judicial orders in copyright
infringement actions. 44 Moreover, prominent IP scholars such as Robert
Merges believe that the Lockean notion of the original commons fits well
with both property and IP rights. 45 Justin Hughes similarly maintains that
“Locke’s unique theoretical edifice [may find] its firmest bedrock in the
common of ideas.” 46 According to Adam Mossoff, “[t]he legal implication
of Lockean property theory is inescapable: if the purpose of the state is to
secure property rights, then the law should secure as property the valuable
products and services created by original laborers.” 47
Property skeptics, contrarily, insist that a natural rights approach to
copyright leads to an unacceptable broadening of rights for creators at the
expense of users; therefore, they instead focus on other non-property related
justifications for the doctrine, such as “social relations” theory 48 or human
rights theory. 49 Most such claims are rooted in a collectivist approach to
copyright, which shifts the focus from the individual author, without whom
40. STEPHEN R.C. HICKS, POSTMODERNISM: SKEPTICISM AND SOCIALISM FROM ROUSSEAU TO
FOUCAULT 9 (2011).
41. See MAY & COOPER, supra note 38, at xiv. See also, Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP
at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2021 (2009) (claiming that the impact
of and commitment to Locke’s property theory on our Founders, particularly James Madison, “was
tremendous”).
42. Davidson, supra note 29, at 594.
43. COOPER & MAY, supra note 38, at 45.
44. See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Agianst A
Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 16 (2002) (“Ample evidence of Lockean
rhetoric can be found in copyright cases. It is not uncommon for explanations of copyright protection to
emphasize the importance of ensuring ‘that men of ability . . . may not be deprived their just merits and
the reward of their ingenuity and labour’”).
45. MERGES, supra note 35, at 35.
46. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL,
LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 141 (Adam D. Moore, ed., 1997) (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997).
47. Mossoff, supra note 41, at 2020.
48. Madhavi Sunder, Ip3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257 (2006).
49. Osei Tutu, supra note 31, at 210.
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the work would not exist, to that of an unnamed group of third-party users.
For example, arguing for “a paradigm shift from a rights-based to a public
interest approach,” Carys Craig maintains that “the Lockean account
mistakenly finds the justification for copyright in the relationship between
an author and her work, rather than in the role played by intellectual works
in the processes of social dialogue.” 50 She asserts that
[w]hen the creative process is recharacterized as collective rather than
individual, it becomes difficult to explain how a property right can be
accorded to an individual on the basis of individual labour. According a
property right over the abstract object overlooks the historical, social and
cultural components of that object. Once it is recognized that every ideal
object is necessarily the “joint product of human intellectual history,” the
simple claim to a right over the fruits of one’s labour is emptied of
meaning: the fruit of intellectual labour has no definable boundary. This
recognition reveals not only a practical difficulty in the application of
Lockean theory to intellectual property, but also an important weakness in
the deontological justification of property acquisition. As Horacio Spector
explains: “[i]f the labour employed by a person does not offer an
explanation for the total value of a commodity—and only explains the
added value—then Locke’s theory does not justify ownership over the
whole commodity.” Paradoxically by focusing on individual labour, the
rationale for individual ownership over intellectual creations actually
dissipates. The interdependent nature of human culture means that
intellectual works are necessarily the products of collective labour and so
ought to be owned collectively. 51

As discussed in more detail in the following sections, the call for a
major paradigm shift from individual to collective authorship and ownership
in copyright law promulgated by Carys Craig and other scholars is directly
contrary to the individual rights-based premises established in the Progress
Clause. 52 It is also one of the main characteristics of the totalitarian society
depicted by Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which all property and IP is
owned by and for the pleasure, use, and manipulation of the state.
Other property skeptics go as far as exclaiming that the historical record
does not at all support Locke’s explanation of the origin of property and that
“the argument has been decisively defeated time and again at law.”53
Contrary to this assertion, though, there is ample early evidence that the
constitutional framework of copyright law was in fact grounded in Lockean
natural rights, which undeniably recognize that literary authors are “as much

50. Craig, supra note 44, at 1 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 35-36.
52. See MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM: A WRITER’S MANIFESTO 13 (2009) (“the Founders
laid down principles that have served to prevent the transformation of the individual to a mere
manipulable quantity, of citizen to subject”).
53. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property Revolution Is
Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 151 (2007).
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entitled to the product of [their] labour as any other member of society.” 54
According to Jane Ginsburg,
The Constitution authorizes Congress to “secure” to authors “the
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings. . .” In eighteenth-century terms,
“exclusive right” meant property. Madison, in the Federalist Papers,
supported this measure by emphasizing both the public benefit to be
derived from authors’ private rights, and that the authors’ exclusive right
had already been recognized in England as “a right at common law.”
Copyright was a property right like other property rights, vesting its owner
with control over its disposition. The constitutional text’s employment of
the word “securing” demonstrates that the property right was not for
Congress to create, but rather to reaffirm and to strengthen. 55

Also contrary to claims by modern scholars that Locke himself did not
endorse IP rights, he explicitly recognized that his natural rights theory
advocated them. 56 In Locke’s Second Treatise, he identifies “Inventions and
Arts” as labors that “had improved the conveniences of Life” and that
exemplified his insight that “Man (by being the Master of himself, and
Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions of Labour of it) had still in
himself the great Foundation of Property.” 57
Locke also openly endorsed copyright as the “property” of authors,
even proposing an amendment to the Bill for Regulating Printing, proposed
in Parliament in 1695, in order “[t]o secure the author’s property in his copy,
or his to whom he has transferred it.” 58 Therefore, principles of
individualism that are at the heart of the Lockean labor theory indubitably
prevailed during the post-Enlightenment founding of our country and our
Constitution, as witnessed by “the American aspirational ethos of
opportunity and social mobility flowing from individual effort” that can be
found in many writings of our Founders. 59
Within this broad framework of individualism versus collectivism in
copyright, it is important to note that the DOA debate firmly pits property
essentialists against property skeptics regarding the question of who should
own and control works that are the subject of copyright law. In accordance
with Lockean theory, property essentialists maintain that those individual
authors who labor to create works should own them, while property skeptics
advocate for the rights of the largely undefined “collective” of others who
consume and/or reuse them.
54. Davidson, supra note 29, at 603 (citing the 1834 Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters, in
which “the Court readily recognized the natural right in an author’s work”). See Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. 591 (1834).
55. Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Exclusive Right to Their Writings”: Copyright and Control in the
Digital Age, 54 ME. L. REV. 195, 202 (2002) (citing, THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) [hereinafter, The Exclusive Right].
56. Mossoff, supra note 41, at 2048.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Stuart V. C. Duncan Smith, Individualism and Republicanism in the Intellectual Property
Clause, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 432, 439-40 (2013).

36

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION

VOL 21:1

A natural rights approach to IP protection unquestionably supports the
individual creator over the amorphous, socialist concept of the masses or
collective “others.” Yet, its foundational premises have been under almost
constant scholarly assault, “including attacks premised upon the idea that
such rights are mere legal conventions that may be readily curtailed or even
rescinded.” 60
It is, without doubt, fashionable today for copyright scholars (and their
students) to ambush the natural rights foundations upon which our
constitutional Framers drafted the Progress Clause, which demands that
exclusive rights are afforded to copyright authors. 61 Still, it is axiomatic that
the Framers viewed authors not as collectives, but as persons whose
individual works “had social significance as well as personal significance.” 62
Similarly, Jane Ginsburg recognizes that because copyright arises out of the
act of creating works, authors also have a moral claim over those works that
no other third party has. She thus wrote that “much of copyright law makes
sense only if one recognizes the centrality of the author, the human creator
of the work.” 63
What, then, is the source of the scholarly dissonance when it seems
manifestly obvious that only human beings can create intellectual works, not
amorphous collectives? Why is it that modern copyright academicians
remain so uncomfortable with the traditional property-rights focused, natural
law theory upon which our Framers drafted the Constitution and upon which
courts still see fit to frame and focus their inquiries in copyright infringement
cases? 64
Carys Craig rightly observed that “[t]he particular species of
justification [scholars] offer . . . defines the extent of the rights that copyright
confers, and the kinds of limits that naturally evolve to demarcate those
rights.” 65 In the remainder of this article, I demonstrate that the particular
species of justification offered by the DOA scholars is a complete negation
of the natural rights foundation upon which copyright, and much of our
Constitution, is based.
While their postmodern theories are supposedly premised upon a
defense of the public domain and the societally marginalized “other,” if one
pierces through this veil, the DOA attacks can be seen for what they really
60. COOPER & MAY, supra note 38, at 8.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Michael Brandon Lopez, Creating the National Wealth: Authorship, Copyright, and Literary
Contracts, 88 N.D. L. REV. 161, 178 (2012).
63. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1063, 1068 (2003) [hereinafter, The Concept of Authorship].
64. MERGES, supra note 35, at 3 (“Countless judges begin their IP decisions with one or another
familiar ‘stage setter’ about how IP protection exists to serve the public interest . . . [b]ut these utilitarian
platitudes quickly give way to doctrinal details, which often show the unmistakable imprint of something
more fundamental, something beyond utility. . . That is, courts often wind up talking about IP rights as
rights”) (emphasis in original).
65. Craig, supra note 44, at 2.
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are: a means to delegitimize the foundations of individual rights in favor of
a collectivist ideology that will eventually devolve into an Oceania-like state
of totalitarianism. 66 One small but decisive step that will invidiously lead to
this unfortunate result—among others employed by radical progressive
postmodernists—is to declare with resoluteness that the author is, in fact,
dead.
II.

THE POSTMODERN DECONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP

Given the constitutional importance of the role of authors towards the
progress of “science” (or knowledge), which is one of the twin goals of the
Progress Clause, 67 it seems an oversight that the term has never been
precisely defined in any iteration of the U.S. Copyright Act. 68 In fact, it was
not until 1884 in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony that the Supreme
Court defined the term “author.” 69 Even then, the Court “elided the task of
defining authorship by merely citing to Worcester’s Dictionary and positing
that an author is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker;
one who completes a work of science of literature.’” 70
Certainly, the plain or dictionary meaning of “author” on its face seems
to comport well with the concepts of exclusivity and progress as
contemplated in the Progress Clause. It also makes perfect sense from a
natural rights theory, which as observed in Section I, justifies protection of
artistic creations from an individualistic, labor-driven ethos. As such, from
a legal perspective, the standard definition of authorship provided by the
Burrow-Giles court has since been widely accepted by courts in copyright
infringement cases without much deviation or controversy. 71
A. The Death of the Author in French Literary Theory
Whereas the concept of authorship is hardly contested in the ordinary
copyright case, 72 it underwent serious questioning in literary circles in the
late 1960s during the postmodern/social deconstructionist movement when
French literary theorists Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault metaphorically
killed the author within the humanities departments of universities
66. The Jordan B. Peterson Podcast, Season 4 Episode 3: Douglas Murray, at 1:15:20 to 1:17:03
(Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_RrYz85E1A [https://perma.cc/N47S-KYPB].
67. The other is progress of the “useful arts,” which is the subject of patent law, providing inventors
the exclusive rights to their inventions and discoveries for limited times. See supra note 24.
68. John Tehranian, Copyright’s Male Gaze: Authorship and Inequality in A Panoptic World, 41
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 343, 347 (2018) (“the statute tells us nothing about how to pinpoint the identity
of an author, especially when there are competing claims of authorship”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In the ordinary copyright
case, authorship and fixation are not contested; most works presented for copyright are unambiguously
authored and unambiguously fixed”).
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worldwide. Together these critics opposed modernist/post-Enlightenment
literary theory by launching “a heavy and largely victorious assault on the
sensible belief that a text means what its author meant.” 73 In his
infamous 1968 essay, “The Death of the Author,” Barthes launched the
vicious attack on traditional principles of authorship in which he openly
rejected the notion that the author should be celebrated or even considered
by society as either the creator or the proprietor of his work. 74
A year later, in “What is an Author?,” Foucault largely agreed with
Barthes that “the function of the author after assembling the final literary
work is to disseminate it, at which point the author ceases to exist.” 75
Foucault—in my estimation the most destructive of the French
postmodernists—is not only interested in killing off the concept of “author,”
but he also existentially and darkly adds that Man is “an invention of recent
date” that will soon be erased “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the
sea.” 76 Foucault cynically abnegates the concepts of human dignity,
individuality, and achievement that post-Enlightenment natural rights
theorists commonly celebrate:
The author—or what I have called the “author-function”—is undoubtedly
only one of the possible specifications of the subject and, considering past
historical transformations, it appears that the form, the complexity, and
even the existence of this function are far from immutable. We can easily
imagine a culture where discourse would circulate without any need for
an author. 77

Acknowledging that the replacement of the human author with the cold,
machine-like “author-function” can only be gradual, Foucault “claims it
would be desirable because authors today serve to constrict, not create,
meaning.” 78
The flock of Foucault’s zealous followers interpret this cryptic, largely
nonsensical writing to mean that “the post-structuralists argue that language,
not a solitary author, writes texts.” 79 For example, in his DOA scholarship
Lionel Bentley touts the French theorists as follows:
Foucault urged us to imagine a culture where discourse would circulate
without any need for an author, a world where it did not matter who was
speaking. Roland Barthes went one step further and declared the “death of
the author.” Barthes argued that, once published, the text is no longer
under the control of the author and that the author is irrelevant. Instead,
Barthes asserted that the text is merely a product of other texts and can
73. E. D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 11 (1967).
74. P. Prayer Elmo Raj, Author and Text: Reading Michel Foucault’s What is an Author, 3 THE
CRITERION: INT’L J. ENG. 2, 2 (2012).
75. Lopez, supra note 62, at 177.
76. See HICKS, supra note 40, at 195.
77. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY
321, 333 (Donald Preziosi ed., 2009).
78. Elton Fukumoto, The Author Effect After the “Death of the Author”: Copyright in A Postmodern
Age, 72 WASH. L. REV. 912, 913 (1997).
79. Id. at 912.
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only be understood through those other texts. Individual authorship of
works is to be replaced by intertextuality. 80

Of course, to a rational person, it makes no sense that language (a noun
having no agency) can actually write texts or that meaningful discourse can
somehow circulate without any need for authors. With their stated goals of
eliminating the author and even erasing mankind, the postmodernists
nonetheless make all manner of ridiculous assertions such as these regarding
how art and literature magically come into existence through an undefined
functional intertextuality, whatever that may mean. Resonating with
Foucault’s negative, Marxist-driven view of human individuality, the DOA
agenda of today’s radical postmodernists is a “sweeping criticism” of
traditional genius and creativity, “which claims that the concepts of a subject,
an individual, a consciousness, a method, and a meaning are philosophical
fictions that have no existence prior to their social constructions.”81
This deconstructionist view of the world upon which the DOA
propaganda depends was born from a postmodern philosophy emanating
from the despair of post-World War II European academicians 82 that “rejects
the reason and the individualism that the entire Enlightenment world
depends upon.” 83 It insists that the bedrock principles upon which our
democratic republic is premised, such as experience, reason, freedom,
individualism, and progress are past “pathologies” that must be replaced with
a new model of “linguistic social subjectivism.” 84
It is a dour, pessimistic, and morally relativistic approach which “says
that we never know what universal true or false is, what is good or bad, right
or wrong; we know only stories about true, false, good, bad, right or
wrong.” 85 By manipulating the ordinary meaning of language, the
deconstructionist movement attempts to redefine “psychological constructs
such as the ‘mind,’ ‘self,’ and ‘emotion’ as socially constructed processes
that are not intrinsic to the individual but produced by social discourse.” 86
Deconstructionists believe that “the content of our consciousness, and the
mode of relating we have to other, is taught by our culture and society; all
the metaphysical quantities we take for granted are learned from others
around us.” 87
80. Lionel Bently, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 MOD. L. REV.
973, 973 (1994).
81. Id. at 912-13.
82. See Helen Pluckrose, How French “Intellectuals” Ruined the West: Postmodernism and Its
Impact, Explained, AREO, March 27, 2017, https://areomagazine.com/2017/03/27/how-frenchintellectuals-ruined-the-west-postmodernism-and-its-impact-explained/ [https://perma.cc/BM5N-JBSB]
(“Decidedly left-wing, postmodernism had both a nihilistic and a revolutionary ethos which resonated
with a post-war, post-empire zeitgeist in the West.”).
83. HICKS, supra note 40, at 14.
84. Id.
85. Alexandra Galbin, An Introduction to Social Constructionism, 26 SOC. RSCH. REPS. 82, 82
(2014).
86. Id. at 84.
87. Id.
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Anti-individualist and deleterious in its nature, deconstructionism “is a
way of thinking and doing that moves away from expertise-based, rational,
hierarchical, and result-focused models going toward more participatory,
cocreative, and process-centered ones.” 88 For example, Barthes abnegates
the entire creative nature of the author, claiming him to be a mere passive
“scriptor” who is the unoriginal and unfeeling reporter of our cultural past:
The writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original.
His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in
such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to express
himself, he ought at least to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to
‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only
explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely . . .. Succeeding
the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours,
feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he
draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than imitate
the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs an imitation that is
lost, infinitely deferred. 89

By reframing copyright notions of individuality, personal expression,
and originality in such an existentially negative manner, Barthes radically
attempts to transform all the qualities that have made authorship of our most
profoundly meaningful cultural works possible and enduring, reducing them
to a common and dispassionate amalgam of nothingness that is the fabric on
which totalitarian dreams are weaved. Moreover, “such supposed
‘reconstruction’ of intellectual property is inconsistent with fundamental
principles concerning our rights that are firmly embodied in the American
constitutional order grounded in classical liberal principles.” 90
Largely motivated by collectivist precepts, the DOA movement claims
to have exposed the fiction of agency and the notion of genius present in the
great canons of literature; “geniuses themselves were widely dismissed as
desiccated relics of the past, part of a mummified category and order of
things that was likewise dead and gone.” 91 Because the goal of the
deconstructionist is “to assail, undermine and finally pull down everything
that had previously appeared to be fixed certainties,” 92 the movement in
essence amounts to a “broad-based attack on the modern foundations of
democracy.” 93 Pluckrose describes the modern era attacked by the
postmodernists as
88. Galbin, supra note 85, at 91. Pluckrose states that, in postmodernism, we see an explicit
epistemic relativism (belief in personal or culturally specific truths or facts) and the advocacy of
privileging “lived experience” over empirical evidence. We see too the promotion of a version of
pluralism which privileges the views of minority groups over the general consensus of scientists or liberal
democratic ethics which are presented as authoritarian and dogmatic. See Pluckrose, supra note 82.
89. Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142, 146-47 (Stephen Heath
trans., 1977).
90. COOPER & MAY, supra note 38, at 16.
91. DARRIN M. MCMAHON, DIVINE FURY: A HISTORY OF GENIUS 237 (2013).
92. MURRAY, supra note 23, at 54.
93. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON
TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 4 (1997).
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the period of history which saw Renaissance Humanism, the
Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution and the development of liberal
values and human rights; the period when Western societies gradually
came to value reason and science over faith and superstition as routes to
knowledge, and developed a concept of the person as an individual
member of the human race deserving of rights and freedoms rather than as
part of various collectives subject to rigid hierarchical roles in society. 94

Radical progressives criticize modern-world concepts such as
knowledge, reason, and merit, which they believe are “culturally contingent,
and thus suspect” 95 and for them
knowledge is intensely personal. Personal perspective, however, is not
individual. Instead, it is based on membership in a group. Like everything
else, knowledge is also political in the sense that it is a method of
maintaining established hierarchies. Knowledge thus cannot be evaluated
apart from the social roles—and, in particular, the race and gender—of
those who claim to know. 96

The postmodernists thus conveniently assert that knowledge, reason and
merit cannot be judged by employing traditional standards, and that these
concepts should only be tested by their political effect and their ability to
further the interests of the fringe group that wants to rapidly change the law,
not to understand it. 97
Not surprisingly, therefore, the core premise of the BarthesFoucauldean worldview is that all human interactions should be viewed and
analyzed from within an unforgiving and perverse prism of power. 98
Foucault suggested that “underlying what counts as objective knowledge is
a power relation, one category of people benefiting at the expense of another
category of people.” 99 Consequently, the radical deconstructionists “would
jettison our inherited culture in its entirety in the name of empowering the
downtrodden,” essentially attempting “to overturn the foundations of
American legal thought.” 100 While such a planned utopia may sound
enticing upon first blush, I will show in Section IV how Orwell dispelled the
supposedly altruistic intentions of such power-infused movements and
revealed that power qua power is, in fact, their lusty purpose.
As applied to the concept of authorship, in particular, deconstructionists
do not merely desire to deconstruct the author but to crush and kill him,
entirely rejecting any possibility that the author presents society with “some
kind of creative, conscious act.” 101 Thanks also to Foucault and his stalwart
admirers, academics, and others who insist on deconstructing the notion of
94. Pluckrose, supra note 82.
95. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 93, at 25.
96. Id. at 29.
97. Id. at 30.
98. MURRAY, supra note 23, at 53.
99. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 93, at 24.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Doris Estelle Long, Dissonant Harmonization: Limitations on “Cash N’ Carry” Creativity, 70
ALB. L. REV. 1163, 1187 (2007).
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the author steadfastly deny that it represents individuated creative genius. 102
Particularly relevant to the contemporary digital age in which it has become
increasingly difficult for owners of original content to police their
copyrighted works on the Internet, 103 Foucault’s philosophy becomes an
irresistible force with which to justify an outright assault on the traditional
meaning of an author and the process of authorship:
The author-function in a technocratic age finds no significance as the
definition of authorship and the purpose of authorship increasingly
becomes complex through the digital and e-resources. In the same manner,
the name of the author and the function of the name as Foucault imagines
might not be significant, as the creators do not matter but only the content.
The author is distanced from the subject function but accrues on the
manner where the personal name becomes a collective rational force
behind the outcome of the text. 104

As I discuss in the next Section, this deconstructionist philosophy of
postmodernist literary criticism opened the door for legal scholars whose
manifest intent is to annihilate the natural rights premises upon which
copyright law works.
B. The Dead Author and Cancel [©opyright] Culture
In the wake of the highly influential DOA movement in literary circles,
and because the notion of author is so central to copyright law, 105 in the
1980s, legal scholars began to speculate whether the literary critique of the
author concomitantly threatened the very foundations upon which copyright
law stands. 106 They reasoned that “[i]f the legal walls establishing ownership
of the text were built on the same intellectual foundations as romantic
authorship, and those premises turn out to be sand rather than rock, copyright
will sooner or later come tumbling down.” 107 Matt Williams describes the
movement as follows:
For more than twenty years, a slow struggle to use postmodern
recognitions to draw attention to ambiguities and assumptions regarding
creativity has framed academic discourse regarding copyright theory. The
process has unmasked the author, empowered the audience, reconsidered

102. Id. at 1188.
103. Cf., Sherisse Pham, How much has the US lost from China’s IP theft?, CNN BUSINESS.COM,
March
23,
2018,
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/23/technology/china-us-trump-tariffs-iptheft/index.html [https://perma.cc/NA4M-33UY] (quoting a US Trade Representative who claimed that
“Chinese theft of American IP currently costs between $225 billion and $600 billion annually”).
104. Raj, supra note 74, at 10.
105. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Folklore and Symbolism of Authorship in American
Copyright Law, 54 HOUSTON L. REV. 403, 404 (2016) (“Authorship is the real sine qua non of copyright
law. Regardless of whether one’s theory of copyright is normative or descriptive, explanatory or
justificatory, or consequentialist or deontic, authorship occupies a central place therein”).
106. Bentley, supra note 80, at 974.
107. Id.
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the work, supported generative technological networks, and celebrated the
remix. 108

Jane Ginsburg observes that, whereas scholars used to discuss copyright
in terms of authorship, today the discourse has been recharacterized as “a
law of users’ rights” that will tolerate exclusive rights for authors “only so
far as they enhance the instruction, or perhaps the convenience, of users.” 109
Similarly, Christian Stallberg claims:
Today it is a common occurrence that intellectual works never originate
exclusively from the person authorship is attributed to. Instead, every
author is integrated into the manifold social and cultural contexts from
which he steadily borrows. Thus, creating intellectual works always
means the appropriation of preceding ideas. This point has been
emphasized by the deconstructivism movement which focuses on
deconstructing authorship and disclosing its ideological character. 110

Similarly, Doris Estelle Long overtly reveals the eventual fate of the
copyright author should the radical postmodern agenda prevail:
Since the role of authorial consciousness is diminished under a poststructuralist view of creativity, the need for a putative author’s ability to
control the economic exploitation of her work through the property rights
of copyright appears similarly diminished. If all creativity, therefore,
involves appropriation, then a fortiori appropriation is creative. Following
this construct to its logical conclusion, if every appropriation is creative,
then nothing is “not creative.” Ultimately, creativity itself becomes a
meaningless construct.” 111

When examined closely, four disturbing axioms underlie these
scholarly claims, which are today representative of the majority of articles
on the copyright author. First, it is a myth that individual authors create
anything original because they merely borrow, regurgitate, and appropriate
from others and the public domain. Second, all works of authorship are, at
best, on the same par and, at worst, not even creative at all. Third, any fealty
or reverence for the traditional role of the author is misguided and even
unjust, racist, and bigoted. Lastly, because the postmodern scholars in their
infinite wisdom have conclusively proven the “true” role of the “authorfunction,” there are no longer natural rights or any other moral or
philosophical justifications for exclusive property ownership in creative
works of art.
It is clear to me that an appreciable number of copyright instructors and
by extension, their students, have radically embraced the postmodern DOA
mythos due to its utility in providing a supposed justification for chipping

108. Matt Williams, Silence and Postmodern Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 47–48
(2011).
109. Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 2 (1997)
[hereinafter Authors and Users].
110. Christian G. Stallberg, Towards A New Paradigm in Justifying Copyright: An UniversalisticTranscendental Approach, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 333, 337 (2008).
111. Long, supra note 101, at 1189.
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away at the exclusive rights of copyright authors.112 Ironically, faculty
members who attack the foundational tenets of copyright routinely utilize the
Copyright Act to secure exclusive ownership of their own books and articles
on point. 113 Although they can be called out on their hypocritical, radical
inconsistencies, they nonetheless “cannot be dismissed easily because of
their substantial influence within the American academy in general and also
specifically within the legal academy through the critical legal studies
movement.” 114
If creative works of art are globally accepted as un-authored—and
therefore, unoriginal—in the manner suggested by the DOA scholars, it
would be much more palatable for courts to pardon blatant acts of
appropriation by defendants that have historically been proscribed. This is,
indeed, the main goal of the DOA copyright scholars, which will be revealed
in the following section by examining and scrutinizing their works within
the context of the totalitarian themes created by Orwell in Nineteen EightyFour, as well as explored in three of his other essays.
III.

A SUMMARY OF GEORGE ORWELL’S NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR

Written by Orwell on a secluded island in the Hebrides of Scotland
while he was dying of tuberculosis, Nineteen Eighty-Four is his last word on
a myriad of profound theories and topics on which he focused a life of serious
thought and writing, the most enduring of which was a macabre vision of life
under totalitarian regimes. 115 Although Orwell is most famously known for
his darkly dystopian portrayals of totalitarianism, the topics covered in his
writings explore his reflections on an array of various societal ills, including
power lust, political corruption and betrayal, the abuse of language and its

112. See HELPRIN, supra note 52, at 53-54 (observing that students today have been entirely
indoctrinated from as early as primary school by our modern education system, which “promotes
collectivism versus what it perceives as destructive, self-promoting individualism.” This intense
“communitarianism” is drilled into them throughout their university and graduate studies and is taught
“as an imperative to which even the slightest resistance is suspect as immorality”).
113. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
CREATIVITY (2004); PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN
COPYRIGHT (2011); JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY (2006). For a scathing critique of this phenomenon, see HELPRIN, supra
note 52, at 66-68 (claiming that proponents of Lessig’s Creative Commons movement make a show of
their supposed generosity by toting the free sharing of authored works, yet while they write in favor of
abolishing copyright, they publish and sell their books under copyright).
114. Fukumoto, supra note 78, at 912.
115. See e.g., Samantha Senn, All Propaganda is Dangerous, but Some are More Dangerous than
Others: George Orwell and the Use of Literature as Propaganda, 8 J. OF STRATEGIC SEC. 149, at 15556 (2015) (“While it is obvious how such a totalitarian society [portrayed by Orwell] could be considered
a criticism of the Soviet Union . . . Orwell intended Nineteen Eighty-Four to be a warning against any
type of totalitarianism, abroad or at home”).
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impact on the range of thought, systematic political hypocrisy amongst
intellectuals, and the idea of objective truth. 116
The “real targets” of Orwell’s writing include intellectual dishonesty,
the degradation of human feeling, and the dangers of absolute power of any
type. 117 The remainder of this section thoroughly explores these topics
within the context of Nineteen Eighty-Four, and Section V further analyzes
them as applied to the DOA scholarship and the Cancel Culture movement.
A. The Main Storyline
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell depicts a fictional future dystopian
society known as Oceania, in which an all-knowing, all-powerful, and allcontrolling government has eviscerated all the societal freedoms that had
formerly been embraced by Western democracy. In the novel, Oceania
(formerly Europe) is perpetually at war with two other superpowers, Eurasia
and Eastasia. In Airstrip One (formerly Great Britain), the oppressive
totalitarian ruling party Ingsoc (short for English Socialism, also referred to
as the “Party”) has converted all economic and personal resources to state
ownership and thoroughly eliminated all guarantees of individual freedom
and privacy:
Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or
awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed—
no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside
your skull. 118

Hannah Arendt claims that the very nature of totalitarian regimes is to
demand unlimited power, which “can only be secured if all men, without a
single exception, are reliably dominated in every aspect of their life.” 119 The
job of the Thought Police, thus, is to keep the citizens of Oceania from
expressing or even conceiving any original or independent thought, an act
that is punishable by death as “thoughtcrime.”
Constantly monitored by telescreens in every facet of their daily lives,
residents of Oceana are forced to succumb to the collectivist political
ideologies of “Big Brother”—the largely symbolic yet omnipresent leader of
Ingsoc—or else face being caught by the Thought Police and literally
“eliminated” by the Party. 120 Akin to the fate of those subject to today’s
Cancel Culture movement, for those who do not outwardly align with the
majority politics,

116. Piers H.G. Stephens, Nature and Human Liberty: The Golden Country in George Orwell’s
‘1984’ and an Alternative Conception of Human Freedom, 17 ORG. & ENV’T 76, 81 (2004).
117. Id. at 82.
118. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1 at 29.
119. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 456 (1975).
120. The Thought Police was a clandestine agency closely resembling the Gestapo; it was responsible
for the suppression and punishment of free thinkers like Smith. See Diglin, supra note 14, at 611.
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there was no trial . . . Your name was removed from the registers, every
record of everything you had ever done was wiped out, your one-time
existence was denied and then forgotten. You were abolished, annihilated:
vaporized was the usual word. 121

The novel follows the story of protagonist Winston Smith, who
becomes a detractor of the Party. The Thought Police eventually capture
Winston and brutally torture him until he not only succumbs to the will of
Big Brother, but also is entirely brainwashed to fully accept and “love” Big
Brother. Through Winston’s adventures, Orwell thematically comments on
various social and political trends in twentieth-century England, the threads
of which he believed to run through the fabric of all totalitarian regimes, and
the dangers of which he sternly attempted to warn the post-war British
intelligentsia of his time.
B. Orwell’s Objective: A Warning to Intellectuals
Literary critics have observed that Orwell modelled the propaganda
state of Oceania on both Nazi Germany and Joseph Stalin’s U.S.S.R. 122
Erika Gottlieb, for example, maintains that Orwell intended the novel “as a
parody of the intellectual implications of the totalitarian mentality” and “the
perversions of a centralized economy.” 123 Orwell’s themes are, therefore,
directly relevant to my central thesis in this article: that the movement to kill
the traditional author is one of an array of academic strategies that slowly,
and possibly largely subconsciously, 124 will change the trajectory of our
culture from one that celebrates the progress of individual achievements to
one that cowers in collectivist malaise. It is a misguided and unwise path
that will subtly and slowly debilitate our individual talents, achievements,
and goals until we are fully reliant (and happy to be so) on the nanny state of
government-controlled creativity.
Naming Orwell as a founding father of anti-Communism, Christopher
Hitchens describes him as a stout individualist and patriot who knew right
from wrong, reposed a faith in popular wisdom, despised government and
bureaucracy, and distrusted academics.125 In keeping with these attributes,
particularly with respect to his distrust of Marxist-leaning academics, Orwell
wrote two essays largely directed to this sector of British intelligentsia that
warned against their continued forays into collectivist ideology, which he
121. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1 at 21 (emphasis in original).
122. Diglin, supra note 14, at 613. See also George M. Enteen, George Orwell and the Theory of
Totalitarianism: a 1984 Retrospective, 36 J. GEN. EDUC. 206, 206 (1984) (“Orwell’s novel has, of course,
obvious reference to a historical entity (Stalinist Russia) and we also have the author’s word that Nazi
Germany was not entirely removed from his mind”).
123. Erika Gottlieb, The Function of Goldstein’s Book: Time as Theme and Structure in Dystopian
Satire, 3 UTOPIAN STUD. 12, 12 (1991).
124. COOPER & MAY, supra note 38, at xv (“This diminishment of IP rights is made easier, if not
generated, at least in some minds, perhaps even in the subconscious of some minds, by sloganeering of
the oft-repeated ‘information wants to be free’ variety”).
125. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, WHY ORWELL MATTERS 79 (2002).
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believed was the springboard to modern totalitarian forms of government.
In writing his essays, Orwell conceived the story line that would form the
basis of his best-known and influential novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.
In his 1945 essay, “Notes on Nationalism,” Orwell introduces the sociopolitical motifs upon which he would build and refine a year later when he
began authorship of Nineteen Eighty-Four. 126 Of critical importance to my
thesis in this article, Orwell highlights the dangerous ideologies promulgated
by the British intelligentsia of twentieth-century society, whom he perceives
as being responsible for a persistent “habit of mind which is now so
widespread that it affects our thinking on nearly every subject, but which has
not yet been given a name.” 127 It is unfortunate that Orwell defines this
phenomenon as “nationalism,” a term that even he admits is far less than
precise to capture the sentiments he intends to express in the article.128
Perhaps if here were alive today, Orwell would agree that a more
accurate contemporary term for the societal malaise he was attempting to
expose is “progressivism,” specifically the brand of radicalized
progressivism as trumpeted by the academic elite in universities throughout
the Western world. As this article unfolds, I make the case that Orwell was
trying to process and understand the intellectual penchant towards Marxistapologist theories that were rapidly snowballing throughout academia and
other intellectual circles during the immediate post-World War II timeframe
in which he wrote, and which led directly to the formation of the radical
postmodernist movement.
With this overarching objective in mind, Orwell categorizes and
provides examples of the destructive thought patterns that had been
circulating in twentieth-century academic circles, all of which fall under the
term “nationalism,” and which relate to the main theme of Nineteen EightyFour: the undisguised and unapologetic lust for power, merely for the pure
sake of power itself.
While only a minority of academics during this period openly identified
as Marxist pacifists (this is not the case today) 129 Orwell understood the
psychological and often subconscious tendency of all human beings to lust
for power. 130 His stated goal in the article is “to isolate and identify the
126. George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, in GEORGE ORWELL: ESSAYS 865-84 (Peter Davison, ed.,
2002) [hereinafter, Notes].
127. Id. at 865.
128. Id. (“As the nearest existing equivalent I have chosen the word ‘nationalism’, but it will be seen
in a moment that I am not using it in quite the ordinary sense, if only because the emotion I am speaking
about does not always attach itself to what is called a nation—that is, a single race or a geographical area.
It can attach itself to a church or a class, or it may work in a merely negative sense, against something or
other and without the need for any positive object of loyalty”).
129. Toby Young, The Neo-Marxist Takeover of our Universities, THE SPECTATOR, Sep. 18, 2018,
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-neo-marxist-takeover-of-our-universities
[https://perma.cc/24MA-RUKN].
130. Jordan Peterson frequently claims that human beings must come to terms with the fact that all
humans have mythical monsters lurking within our personalities and so we should “recognize and
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tendencies which exist in all our minds and pervert our thinking, without
necessarily occurring in a pure state or operating continuously.” 131 Indeed,
commentators have observed that a main theme in Nineteen Eighty-Four is
“the totalitarian danger that lies within ourselves and in all the political
systems of our time.” 132 Because this earlier essay was Orwell’s initial
outline for Nineteen Eighty-Four, I will discuss his theory on nationalism in
conjunction with the main themes of the book that pertain to my discussion
of authorship and the broader Cancel [©opyright] Culture craze.
According to Orwell, “a nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly,
in terms of competitive prestige,” or someone who “sees history, especially
contemporary history, as the endless rise and decline of great power
units.” 133 Orwell posits that the most common form of nationalism practiced
among the intellectual elite consists of a loyalty to Communism: those
“fellow travelers” who believe their duty is to “justify Russian policy and
advance Russian interests at all costs.” 134
Orwell identifies various categories of nationalists that he believed
flourished among the intellectuals of his day, including “a minority of
intellectual pacifists whose real though unadmitted motive appears to be
hatred of western democracy and admiration of totalitarianism.” 135 In the
form in which nationalism is present among the intellectuals, “it is a distorted
reflection of the frightful battles actually happening in the external world,
and that its worst follies have been made possible by the breakdown of
patriotism and religious belief.” 136
Orwell was frightened by how these tendencies, which were inspired by
nationalism and did not self-regulate with any moral compass, led to brute
violence against one’s ideological enemies and a desire not to win them over,
but to punish them. 137 Kristian Williams observes that
Orwell tried to adapt himself to violence by separating it from hatred and
hysteria, by refusing to be poisoned by resentment, by pursuing
reconciliation rather than revenge, and by remaining clear-eyed and
pragmatic while admitting that there are limits to what one is willing to
do, and then refusing to transgress those limits. He understood, as too few
of us do, that we cannot pursue an ideal of shared humanity while also
treating our enemies as monsters. By doing so, we defeat our own
purposes and become monsters ourselves. We must, instead, make our
fighting and expression of our ideals. This means, among other things,
understand that evil twin, that mortal enemy, who is part and parcel of every individual.” See. JORDAN
B. PETERSON, MAPS OF MEANING: THE ARCHITECTURE OF BELIEF 311 (1999) [hereinafter MAPS].
131. Orwell, Notes, supra note 126, at 880.
132. MARCELA KNAPP, CULTURAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE WEST GERMAN PUBLIC SPHERE:
AESTHETIC FICTION AND THE CREATION OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES 119 (2020) (quoting Golo Mann, Thomas
Mann’s son).
133. Orwell, Notes, supra note 12, at 867.
134. Id. at 868.
135. Id. at 878.
136. Id. at 883.
137. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 105.

2022

CANCEL [©OPYRIGHT] CULTURE

49

refusing to dehumanize our enemies or to celebrate cruelty, avoiding
deliberate atrocities, resolving to greet victory with magnanimity. 138

Orwell was concerned that once nationalism spreads past a certain point, the
overall quality of all political debate and thought would degrade. 139
Eventually, individual people will turn to dogma over respect for the truth,
at which point they may fabricate evidence and slander their opponents, and
not find these acts to be at all despicable, or even dishonest. 140 Orwell
expanded upon these themes in Nineteen Eighty-Four, creating the despotic,
resentful, war-driven, and hideous world he thought would be the logical
end-result of the nationalist tendencies of the twentieth-century intellectuals.
Of the countless casualties attendant to the creation of such a dystopia, the
metaphorical death of the author is paramount as it relates to a discussion of
Cancel [©opyright] Culture.
IV.

NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR APPLIED TO THE DEATH OF THE
AUTHOR

Nineteen Eighty-Four was written decades before Barthes and Foucault
unleashed their diabolical assault on the traditional Romantic notion of
authorship. Presciently, though, the novel perfectly predicts the rise of
postmodernism and its dangerous deconstructionist ideologies that would
serve as the foundation of contemporary anti-Enlightenment practices such
as radical multiculturalism, identity politics and, of course, Cancel Culture.
Orwell’s brilliant literary opus utilizes powerful topical images to
describe a cold society that has deteriorated away from reason, freedom,
individuality, and human dignity and towards a power hungry, nihilistic
dictatorship. I analyze these themes in the following subsections as they
frighteningly mirror the various ideological principles and goals of the DOA
movement in general, and Cancel [©opyright] Culture in particular.
A. The “Memory Hole:” An Abrogation of Facts and History
A major theme of Nineteen Eighty-Four is the importance of
objectively understanding and keeping accurate records of historical facts
and knowledge. As nineteenth-century Spanish-born American author
George Santayana famously stated, “Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it.” 141 History in this sense, of course, includes
knowledge not only gleaned from books and newspaper and magazine
articles, but also from the beauty and truth that has inspired great works of
art, literature, and the sciences—in short, the stuff upon which copyright law
138. Id. at 105-06.
139. Id. at 127.
140. Id. at 129.
141. See DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/those-who-cannot-remember-thepast-are-condemned-to-repeat-it [https://perma.cc/4Y6D-S45M] (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
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is focused. In the novel, as is indicative to all totalitarian societies, Orwell
portrays a dictatorship form of government that ensures its citizens are only
exposed to state-manufactured and altered “facts” and “histories” that fit
within the ideological narrative of the Party.
The novel follows the life of protagonist Winston Smith, a detractor of
the Party who works in the Records Department at the Ministry of Truth—a
foreboding pyramidal structure established by Big Brother, “which
concerned itself with news, entertainment, education and the fine arts.” 142
Winston contributes to the mission of erasing the facts of history and
retelling them in order to perpetuate the propaganda utilized by the Party and
maintain its power over the people. 143 His job is literally to rewrite
newspaper and magazine articles that contain inconvenient truths for Big
Brother. Inside the Ministry of Truth:
[h]eroes were turned into villains in Soviet biographies and encyclopedias,
figures were air-brushed out of photographs and hence out of existence,
the memory hole has its equivalent in the shredder. 144

Once Winston made the necessary edits and “corrections” to the copy,
“with a movement which was as nearly as possible unconscious, he crumpled
up the original message and any notes that he himself had made, and dropped
them into the memory hole to be devoured by the flames” into an “unseen
labyrinth” that was reached by a pneumatic tube. 145 It was a continuous
process of alteration that
was applied not only to newspapers, but to books, periodicals, pamphlets,
posters, leaflets, films, sound-tracks, cartoons, photographs—to every
kind of literature or documentation 146 which might conceivably hold any
political or ideological significance. Day by day and almost minute by
minute the past was brought up to date.” 147

Within this process, the great canonical works of literature “which had
become ideologically offensive” are replaced by workers in the Ministry of
Truth with “garbled versions” that would become the official “definitive
texts” approved by the Party for dissemination to the masses. 148
It is likely that Orwell modeled the Memory Hole after similar
propagandist tactics that Joseph Stalin actually used during his rule of the
Russian Communist Party. In 1938, Stalin commissioned and published a
“new official history” of the Communist Party, which “consisted in
destroying, together with the older books and documents, their authors and
readers” and which, according to Arendt, “was the signal that the superpurge

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id. at xxii.
Id. at 42.
In other words, to all types of works of authorship that are protected by copyright law.
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 42.
Id. at 45.
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which had decimated a whole generation of Soviet intellectuals had come to
an end.” 149
i.

The Contemporary Academic Assault of the Canon

Unfortunately, widespread tactics to rewrite literary history are no
longer merely the stuff of Orwell’s fiction. For decades, real-world radical
progressives have launched a similar assault that has universally “triumphed
within the academy” upon the authoritative works of Western literature,
because they contend “the canonical designation is always the product of
[sexual and racial] bias.” 150
The movement to add more works to the canon created by female and
minority authors began with a genuinely sanguine and worthy attempt to
establish the widespread inclusivity of marginalized ideas and encourage
robust debate, which should be primary goals of any serious academic.
Unfortunately, such are not the goals of the bands of radical progressives
from all academic disciplines that wound up usurping and poisoning the
movement to widen and diversify the existing canon.
Like most radical progressivist ambitions, the intent of the “canon
busters,” as termed by Peter Shaw in “The Assault on the Canon,” is not one
driven by fairness or democratization in order to make room in the canon for
prior-excluded groups, but rather a political movement to delegitimize and
outright reject the backbone of Western culture. 151 This is evident in a
second-wave movement of the canon assaulters in the late twentieth century:
the goal to treat works within the traditional canon from a new point of view
that was inspired by the French postmodern theorists: “[t]hey should no
longer be revered, but rather dealt with skeptically by teachers—they should
be ‘deconstructed’.” 152 Dominic Welburn describes the “increasing
irreverence toward the Greats” as follows:
In summary, the canon of Western literature, in the new postmodern
intellectual landscape of the late twentieth century, was increasingly seen
as neither impartial, nor as an indicator of original genius and timeless
excellence. Rather, it was a deconstructed contingent of privilege, race,
gender and class. 153

Thus, the notion that the development of the canon, like Western culture
itself, was a patriarchal conspiracy to maintain hierarchical power structures,

149. ARENDT, supra note 119, at 341-42.
150. Peter Shaw, The Assault on the Canon, 102 SEWANEE REV. 257, 257 (1994).
151. Id. See also, HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE DIVERSITY DELUSION: HOW RACE AND GENDER
PANDERING CORRUPT THE UNIVERSITY AND UNDERMINE OUR CULTURE 5 (2018) (arguing that
“[m]ulticulturalism, which took over literary studies in the 1980s, destroyed [the] respect for the canon
while continuing the deconstructive stance of exposing alleged subtexts and suppressed meanings. What
had been an epistemological project became a political one”).
152. Id. at 260.
153. DOMINIC WELBURN, CANON CONTROVERSIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: TWO THEORIES OF
INFLUENCE 42 (2020).
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was the next academic wave that dealt “a revolutionary blow against
society.” 154
Writing in 1994, Shaw correctly observed—and Orwell most certainly
would have agreed—that “[t]he debate over whether the classics of Western
literature deserve their canonical status is a political rather than intellectual
phenomenon.” 155 What Shaw had underestimated, though, is where Orwell
(writing almost five decades earlier than Shaw) adroitly foreshadows with
the memory hole: the current wave of the canon assaulters to actually
vaporize, or cancel the traditional canonical works. At the end of “The
Assault on the Canon,” Shaw naively maintains that the defense of the canon
lingers, despite the “self-delusionary” attempts by academics whom he
claims “are distinctly marginal to establishing the canon,” to alter their
reading lists “to accommodate political demands.” 156 According to Shaw:
These professors occupy the same position as the editors of the Baseball
Encyclopedia who have removed the asterisk from Roger Maris’s homerun record. The fact that this record was achieved in a longer season than
Babe Ruth’s total cannot be erased from the collective memory of baseball
fans. In the end, as with the canon, the final determination of which homerun total was the greater achievement will not be decided by the
authorities. Instead, over time, the issue will be decided by a discussion
based on standards appropriate to baseball. So, too, with the canon and its
standards. As it happens, these standards are fundamental to human
freedom as it is known in the West. 157

In “Notes on Nationalism,” as discussed above, 158 Orwell took much
more seriously the power of the academics to influence politics and,
therefore, the real-world effects of their destructive ideologies. A more
Orwellian—as such, more frighteningly somber—analysis of why radical
postmodern attacks are waged only against the Western canon is offered by
Stephen R.C. Hicks:
If one’s deepest goals are political, one always has a major obstacle to deal
with—the powerful books written by brilliant minds on the other side of
the debate. In literature, there is a huge body of novels, plays, epic poems,
and not much of it supports socialism. Much of it presents compelling
analyses of the human condition from opposed perspectives . . .
Consequently, if you are a Left-wing graduate student or professor, you
have two choices. You can take on the opposing traditions, have your
students read the great books and the great [legal] decisions, and argue
with them in your classes. That is very hard work and also very risky—
your students might come to agree with the wrong side. Or you can find a
way to dismiss the whole tradition, so that you can teach only books that
fit your politics. 159

154. Shaw, supra note 150, at 260.
155. Id. at 257.
156. Id. at 270.
157. Id.
158.See infra, note 126 and accompanying text.
159. HICKS, supra note 40, at 190.
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Hicks describes deconstruction as the “seductive” solution that allows
academics to entirely dismiss and set aside “whole literary and legal
traditions as built upon sexist or racist or otherwise exploitive
assumptions.” 160
ii.

The Mainstream Cancelation of Historical and Literary
Knowledge

While the first benign step taken by the postmodernists was to include
previously marginalized authors into the canon and their second move was
to viscously attack the classical authors and their works, today there is a
direction—not only in academia, but within the mainstream—to entirely
eviscerate whole swaths of historical and literary knowledge, and this is
precisely the warning Orwell issued. For if, as the radicals view it, “a text
can mean anything, then it means nothing more than anything else” and
therefore, “no texts are then great.” 161 Now that the radical progressive
faculty members have instilled this mindset into their students, they have
become enlisted as pawns to assist with a real-world postmodern agenda,
which delegitimizes any form of enlightened self-introspection that may be
inspired by the classics, as well as the historical knowledge that warns us of
the cost of doing so.
For example, in 2020 St. John’s University fired adjunct professor
Richard Taylor, a retired police officer, for asking his students to consider
both the negative and positive aspects of early global trade within the
Columbian Exchange of the early fifteenth century in his “Emergence of a
Global Society” history course. 162 On the day that a student posted an
Instagram complaint about this class, which specifically mentioned Taylor’s
service in the Marine Corps and the New York Police Department, Taylor
was immediately fired without investigation or due process after being told
that he violated the “University’s Policy against Bias, Discrimination, and
Harassment” by teaching his class. 163 When Taylor asked the Director of
Equal Opportunity and Compliance at the university which section(s) of the
2,300 word policy he violated, the latter refused to provide him with the
evidence used to support the finding. 164
In 2020, similar stories about cancel-cultured professors such as Taylor
who dare to teach historical facts and prompt intellectual debate over
complex subjects such as imperialism are at an all-time high.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 199.
162. Teaching History Not Permitted: St. John’s Bulldozes Academic Freedom, Punishes Professor
for Posing Question About ‘Columbian Exchange’, FIRE, Oct. 8, 2020, https://www.thefire.org/teachinghistory-not-permitted-st-johns-bulldozes-academic-freedom-punishes-professor-for-posing-questionabout-columbian-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/7TZ7-GAZ3 ].
163. Id.
164. Id.
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Unquestionably, “the ethereal academic debate over social constructionism,
rationalism, and principles of individual liberty have some very concrete
consequences in the outside world.” 165 Just as in Nineteen Eighty-Four,
historical debate in all forms has today been conveniently canceled.
Copyright scholars now also use more covert tactics in order to achieve
ultimately the same goal of canceling the Western canon. Beginning with
Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee in the 1990s, these scholars have
commonly utilized a repeated trope that reconfigures Enlightenment history
in order to attack the “Romantic” origins of authorship. 166 The basic premise
is that the “persistent notion” of individual authorship that emerged during
the post-Enlightenment Romantic period of literature is merely a myth
utilized by American copyright law, which “makes it difficult for any new
legal synthesis, which would focus on the reality of collective creativity, to
emerge.” 167
Jaszi and Woodmansee viscerally attack the great Romantic authors,
particularly William Wordsworth who openly called for copyright protection
of the individual works that had begun to flourish during the post
Renaissance in England. In a series of co-authored articles, Jaszi and
Woodmansee together wove a fantastic story regarding the evolution of
authorship utilizing Foucauldean principles, intending to “welcome a legal
regime that engages ‘the realities of contemporary polyvocal writing
practice— which is increasingly collective, corporate, and collaborative.’” 168
These few examples show how the Cancel Culture movement has
proven Orwell’s fears regarding the possibility of a total erasure of literary
and artistic history to be correct, and the copyright scholars who promulgate
killing the author are contributing to this eventuality in droves.
Conveniently, the “Romantic” author figure whom copyright scholars
besmirch is perfectly representative of the white-male canon of Western
Enlightenment tradition.
Some academicians have written that the Romantic author is merely the
figurative scapegoat that is blamed for the ever-expanding nature of
copyright, 169 including me. 170 In “The Prevention of Literature,” Orwell
himself prefigured that academic tirades against both individualism and

165. Steven G. Gey, Why Rubbish Matters: The Neoconservative Underpinnings of Social
Constructionist Theory, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1732 (1999).
166. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity,
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 29, 29-31
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
167. Reilly, Tragedy, supra note 26, at 135 (quoting Peter Jaszi).
168. Id. at 141-62.
169. See, e.g., Lionel Bently, R. v. the Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service – 20th
Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, Tuesday, April 10, 2007, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 15 (2008) (“In
the early 1990s, scholars arrested, charged, prosecuted and convicted the “romantic author” of the crime
of copyright expansion”).
170. Reilly, Synergy, supra note 27, at 602.
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romanticism such as these become “a forensic device, the aim of which is to
make the perversion of history seem respectable.” 171 He bemoaned that
Everything in our age conspires to turn the writer, and every other kind of
artist as well, into a minor official, working on themes handed down from
above and never telling what seems to him the whole of the truth. 172

After watching the recent Cancel Culture events play out our current
world stage, and upon further research, I have come to believe that the DOA
movement has a much more insidious agenda akin to that of the Cancel
Culture movement: to largely do away with all individual ideas, voices, and
opinions not in keeping with radically progressive ideologies. In reality,
there is no Ministry of Truth in which a Memory Hole is used to achieve this
goal (yet). However, the catastrophic results are the same: the canon war
becomes a convenient political tool in which to bury historical truths and/or
rewrite them in order to legitimize a particularly evil set of ideological
agendas, with censorship of legal, legitimate, competing ideas at its core.
For example, in his article responding to the recent mob craze to
“cancel,” deface, and even publicly topple and destroy allegedly offensive
statues, Jarrett Stepman finds it absurd that Abraham Lincoln has become a
stated target, as some claim he “did not show through policy or rhetoric that
black lives ever mattered.” 173 Stepman maintains that “[t]he result of these
trends is that we’ve been losing our ability to maintain a clear-eyed view of
our own past. America’s sins have been magnified, its triumphs diminished
and taken for granted.” 174
Similarly, the DOA writers accomplish their nefarious goals by
deconstructing to the point of vaporizing not only the figure of the author
and what it represents in our post-Enlightenment history, but also individual
authors and the merits of their entire canons, ideologies, and lives. This
breed of “absolutist relativism” which Orwell warned us about has failed our
students and our society overall because it “has created a public discourse
incapable of dialogue,” 175 which has been the primary enabling catalyst of
the Cancel Culture movement.
B. “Newspeak”: The End of Original Expression
Just as the alteration of our historical and literary canon is necessary in
a totalitarian society, it is equally important to create an atmosphere in which
the individual is discouraged for fear of retribution from all creative thinking
171. George Orwell, The Prevention of Literature, in GEORGE ORWELL: ESSAYS 934, 931-945 (Peter
Davison, ed., 2002) [hereinafter Prevention].
172. Id. at 932.
173. Jarrett Stepman, Cancel Culture’s Next Targets: George Washington and Abe Lincoln, THE
NATIONAL INTEREST (March 13, 2021), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/cancel-cultures-next-targetsgeorge-washington-and-abe-lincoln-180030 [https://perma.cc/9CAY-C94B].
174. Id.
175. Katie Kelaidis, The Return of the Canon Wars, THE QUILLETTE (April 26, 2018),
https://quillette.com/2018/04/26/return-canon-wars/ [https://perma.cc/ZFL4-68P3].
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and forms of original expression. In Oceania, the Party achieves this, in part,
by the creation and institution of an entirely new language: “Newspeak.”
In the first scene of Nineteen Eighty-Four, we meet Winston as he is
compelled to begin writing the story of his present “predicament” into a
diary, which he had surreptitiously purchased with the intent of
communicating with “the unborn,” hoping that he would inspire a future
world that would be vastly different from the abjectly miserable world of the
present. 176 Such a brazen act of authorship, if discovered, would surely land
him in the fateful hands of the Thought Police, as the truth of his words
would threaten the continued existence of the Party. Whereas Winston had
been preparing for this brave and defiant moment for weeks, he found
himself oddly unable to write:
For some time he sat gazing stupidly at the paper. The telescreen had
changed over to strident military music. It was curious that he seemed not
merely to have lost the power of expressing himself, but even to have
forgotten what it was that he had originally intended to say. For weeks he
had been making ready for this moment, and it had never crossed his mind
that anything would be needed except courage. The actual writing would
be easy. All he had to do was to transfer to paper the interminable restless
monologue that had been running inside his head, literally for years. At
this moment, however, even the monologue had dried up. 177

Orwell’s description of Winston’s brave foray into the world of selfexpressive writing, which was an art that had been nearly forgotten in
Oceania, as “the pen was an archaic instrument, seldom used for even
signatures,” chillingly portrays the destruction of the individual voice that
had once been prized and protected in the formerly Enlightened western
world. 178
In the novel, the creation of Newspeak is the mechanism by which the
Party is able to subjugate the citizens of Oceania by a methodological
purgation of their ability to use “Oldspeak” (the former English language) in
order to think and communicate creatively. Workers in the Research
Department of the Ministry of Truth, such as Winston’s friend Syme, are
employed to compile the Eleventh Edition of the Newspeak Dictionary,
which will be the “definitive edition” or the “shape [Newspeak is] going to
have when nobody speaks anything else.” 179
Syme’s job is to destroy hundreds of words a day and cut the language
“down to the bone” so that the Eleventh Edition “won’t contain a single word
that will become obsolete before the year 2050.” 180 According to Syme, the
stated aim of Newspeak “is to narrow the range of thought,” ever ensuring
that with fewer words, the “range of consciousness [is] always a little
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 54.
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smaller.” 181 One way to ensure the implementation of this goal is akin to the
function of the Memory Hole: destroying the entire canon of Western
literature and changing it into something contradictory of what it used to be;
then not only will the “whole climate of thought” be different, but “there will
be no thought, as we understand it now.” 182
Orwell tacitly juxtaposes Winston’s personal diary in which he
struggles to write about his current life in Oceania with another work of
authorship rumored to exist known only as “the book.” Winston describes
the book as a “terrible” piece without a title, which contains a compendium
of the heresies against the Party concocted by Emmanuel Goldstein, who is
the alleged enemy of Big Brother and public scapegoat for Party
propaganda. 183
After Winston eventually manages to obtain a copy of the book, the
Thought Police capture him before he has a chance to read most of its
content. During Winston’s imprisonment later in the novel, his torturer,
former friend and confidant O’Brien, informs him that Goldstein did not in
fact write the book, but is rather a collective work created by O’Brien and
other collaborators within the hierarchical Inner Party. 184 Here, Orwell may
be suggesting that Goldstein and the whole opposition to Big Brother “may
be a figment created by the Party.”185 Responding to Winston’s obvious look
of surprise in learning this information, O’Brien coldly responds, “No book
is produced individually, as you know.” 186
In addition to books, there are no other forms of art afforded with the
privilege of individual creation in Oceania. The existence of the Stateproduced music—described as “dreadful rubbish”—has even a more sinister
provenance than that of the collective rewriting of classic literature: it is
created by non-human means:
The tune had been haunting London for weeks past. It was one of
countless similar songs published for the benefit of the proles by a subsection of the Music Department. The words of these songs were
composed without any human intervention whatever on an instrument
known as a versificator. 187

181. Id. at 55.
182. Id. at 56.
183. Id. at 15. See also, Gottlieb, supra note 123, at 15 (“Goldstein was a renegade and a backslider
who once, long ago (how long ago nobody quite remembered), had been one of the leading figures of the
Party, almost on a level with Big Brother himself, and then had engaged in counter-revolutionary
activities, had been condemned to death, and had mysteriously escaped and disappeared”).
184. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1 at 274.
185. John O. Lyons, George Orwell’s Opaque Glass in “1984”, WIS. STUD. IN CONTEMP.
LITERATURE, Autumn, 1961, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 39-46, at 43.
186. Id.
187. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1 at 144-45.
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By manner of print, telescreen, and radio, therefore, Big Brother is able to
manipulate public opinion, “enforcing not only complete obedience to the
will of the State, but also complete uniformity of opinion on all subjects.”188
Not only had the creative intellects of the citizens of Oceania become
deadpan and vacuous, but their physical appearances also took on an austere
and sullen lack of expression. Constantly monitored by the telescreens for
any facial indication that would suggest they were engaging in thoughtcrime,
the citizens train themselves to become expressionless in order to survive.
In the scene when Winston first attempts to write in the diary, he hears a
knock at the door, which winds up being his neighbor, but whom he is
convinced is the Thought Police, immediately discovering his illegal actions
and hunting him down:
Already! He sat still as a mouse, in the futile hope that whoever it was
might go away after a single attempt. But no, the knocking was repeated.
The worst thing of all would be to delay. His heart was thumping like a
drum, but his face, from long habit, was probably expressionless. He got
up and moved heavily towards the door. 189

In their regulation clothing, the citizens are likewise indistinguishable,
and “[n]early everyone was ugly, and would still have been ugly even if
dressed otherwise then in the uniform blue overalls.” 190 With these morose
physical and psychological images, Orwell relays the manner by which a
continued dearth of individual creativity and personality, which is evident in
a totalitarian system, invariably leads to the commonality of not only
manipulated and forced thought, but also regulated physical expression.
This opening salvo in Nineteen Eighty-Four immediately sets the tone
of one of its main themes that continues throughout the novel: the slow
deterioration of individual thought and self-expression, which is a dire
eventuality within a totalitarian society. As Winston’s thoughts become
more disjointed, he is increasingly frustrated by the inability to express his
own story and relay his individual belief system. In this penetrating diary
scene, “Orwell establishes the impression that creativity is impossible within
the confines of such a despotic system.” 191 Similarly, in his 1946 essay,
“Prevention of Literature,” Orwell wrote that
the imagination, like certain wild animals, will not breed in captivity. Any
writer or journalist who denies that fact—and nearly all the current praise
of the Soviet Union contains or implies such a denial—is, in effect,
demanding his own destruction. 192

The scene is also perfectly illustrative of Orwell’s belief that within a
totalitarian system of government, or even within other settings,
188.
189.
190.
191.
13.
192.

Id. at 214.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 63.
Malcolm R. Thorp, The Dynamics of Terror in Orwell’s “1984”, BYU STUD., Winter 1984, at
Orwell, Prevention, supra note 171, at 945.
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a powerful group with a unity of common interest in extending its power
can always threaten liberties of life, expression, and thought, whether that
group is openly manifested in a one-party state or hidden behind a plurality
of supposedly competing political groupings that actually disagree over
nothing substantive. This was why he defended individual expression
when threatened by parliaments just as much as when threatened by
dictators. 193

Indeed, the important diary scene thematically depicts how one of the goals
of Big Brother’s manipulation of language accomplished by Newspeak “was
the elimination of all subtleties of meaning and hence of thought,” 194 which
are prerequisites to the creation of original works of authorship as
contemplated by copyright law.
Along with Nineteen Eighty-Four, “[s]everal of Orwell’s essays explore
the conditions that allow or prevent the freedom of expression (and freedom
from self-censorship) [that is] essential for good writing to exist.” 195 In “The
Prevention of Literature,” Orwell considers various “insidious factors”
attributable to the attachment of intellectuals to Soviet Union style
communism, which act to “mitigate against the creation of great, or even
honest literature.” 196
There he also states that “the idea of intellectual liberty” is under attack
by “its theoretical enemies, the apologists of totalitarianism,” which, among
other phenomena, are conspiring “to turn the writer, and every other kind of
artist as well, into a minor official, working on themes handed down from
above and never telling what seems to him the whole of the truth.” 197 In this
unbelievably prognostic passage, Orwell sagaciously predicts the entire
philosophical framework that would underpin the French postmodern era of
deconstructionism, which was still decades away from the making. He
believed that totalitarianism “can never permit either the truthful recording
of facts or the emotional sincerity that literary creation demands.” 198 But he
also understood that to be corrupted by totalitarianism one does not have to
live in a totalitarian country, claiming that “[t]he mere prevalence of certain
ideas can spread a kind of poison that makes one subject after another
impossible for literary purposes.” 199
Similar to the ultimate purpose of Newspeak, the Cancel Culture
movement is today running roughshod over any individual attempt to
question or make independent judgement about the ideological policies
established by the political majority. A private school in New York has
asked its community to replace the use of “mom” and “dad” with “grown193.
194.
195.
106.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Stephens, supra note 116, at 80-81.
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ups,” “folks” or “family,” 200 and the French parliament has voted to banish
the words “mother” and “father” from official paperwork in their education
system. 201
Phrases such as “long time no see” (offensive of the way Native
Americans speak), “hysterical” (sexist because it is derived from the Greek
word for uterus) and “blind spot” (ableist) are not just banned only on college
campuses, but have “oozed down from the Ivory Tower.” 202 The upshot is
that such censorship results in dire consequence to everyday folks who may
innocently use these expressions to their Cancel Culture detriment. Without
doubt, it is almost impossible to keep up with the growing list terms
considered taboo to the overly sensitive mob.
The Politically Correct or PC movement of yesterday was mainly
limited to ugly words with obvious and objectively insulting meanings.
Thanks to Cancel Culture, however, the list of non-obvious words and
phrases banned as offensive in our politically correct culture continues to rise
and now jobs are lost and lives are ruined if anyone dare slip up and use one
of them.
Verily, the DOA scholars have all but accomplished their sinister goal
of manipulating language and reason in order to denigrate the authorial
voices within the genius works of the Western canon. Helprin poignantly
observes the obvious problems that will ensue if such a dangerous trend
continues:
The rights of authorship, the most effective guarantor of which is
copyright, protect fact from casual manipulation; slow the rush to
judgment; fix responsibility; encourage conscience in assertion and
deliberation; and protect the authority of the individual voice, without
which we are little more than nicely yoked oxen, 203

just like the frightened, drab, and expressionless citizens of Oceania.

C. The Glass Paperweight: An Annihilation of Beauty and
Individual Ownership
One of the most disturbing attributes of a totalitarian regime Orwell
depicts masterfully in Nineteen Eighty-Four is the deliberate annihilation of
all objects of art and beauty….eerily foreshadowing the revengeful actions

200. Dustin Barnes, NYC School Defends Inclusive Language Guide Asking Students, Parents to
Avoid Phrases Like ‘Mom and Dad’, USA.COM (March 12, 2021, 4:43 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2021/03/12/nyc-school-defends-guide-askingstudents-avoid-saying-mom-dad/4668994001/ [https://perma.cc/W5HY-3SJ5].
201. Charles Bremmer, ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ to be Banned on Forms as French Schools go GenderNeutral, THE TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019, 12:00 AM) https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mother-and-father-tobe-banned-on-forms-as-french-schools-go-gender-neutral-3pzlrcn6d [https://perma.cc/JCK4-4VGL].
202. Kyle Smith, PC Police Won’t Let Us Use These Words Anymore, NEW YORK POST (May 26,
2018, 3:27 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/05/26/pc-police-wont-let-us-use-these-words-anymore/
[https://perma.cc/DT75-XZ7E].
203. HELPRIN, supra note 52, at 66.
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of non-law-abiding protesters who routinely topple and cancel statutes
today. 204 According to Hicks, the traditional perception of art
was a vehicle of sensuousness, meaning, and passion. Its goals were
beauty and originality. The artist was a skilled master of his craft. Such
masters were able to create original representations with human
significance and universal appeal. Combining skill and vision, artists were
exalted beings capable of creating objects that in turn had an awesome
power to exalt the senses, the intellects, and the passions of those who
experience them. 205

Because totalitarian leaders also recognize “the value and absolute
weight of art,” the act of destroying it and/or transforming it into propaganda
becomes a diabolical mechanism to achieve mass indoctrination.206 By
destabilizing and equalizing art, as well as converting it for propagandist
purposes, therefore, they are able to fashion “what could be called a beautiful
illusion but a complete lie.” 207
Another indispensable feature of totalitarianism is the eradication of all
forms of property ownership, both real and intellectual. For example, in The
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engles admitted that the abolition of
private property was “the quintessence of their movement.” 208 In fact, when
they came into power, the Bolsheviks liquidated all forms of productive
property and converted their citizens into wage-earning employees of the
state; therefore, the entire wealth of the country became public possession.209
Incorporating these features into the novel, Orwell depicts the forlorn
citizens of Oceania as deprived of all forms of both traditional artistic beauty
and property, even down to their dingy state-issued clothing. From the
beginning of the novel, Orwell portrays the dismal, ugly world of Oceania
that smells of the greyed, watered down cabbage soup and sweat of the
workers, in which “there seemed to be no colour in anything” except within
the ominous posters that depict the “black-moustachio’d face” of Big
Brother “gazed down from every commanding corner.” 210
Within this foreboding setting, Winston manages to purchase various
Western-world relics from an antique pawnshop, including the cream-paged
diary from the first scene of the novel, as well as a “heavy lump of glass”
with a “strange, pink, convoluted object that recalled a rose or a sea

204. See Samantha Lock, Portland Rioters Topple Abraham Lincoln and Teddy Roosevelt Statues in
‘Day
of
Rage’
Against
Columbus,
NEWSWEEK
(Oct.
12,
2020, 6:27
AM)
https://www.newsweek.com/portland-rioters-topple-abraham-lincoln-teddy-roosevelt-statues-day-rageagainst-columbus-1538202 [https://perma.cc/QZ5Z-NKMM].
205. HICKS, supra note 40, at 249.
206. Anila Mullahi, The Use of Art and Culture by Politics in a Totalitarian State, 2 EUR. SCI. J. 120,
122 (2014).
207. Id. at 125.
208. Richard Pipes, Human Nature and the Fall of Communism, 49 BULL. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
ARTS AND SCI. 38, 39 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Human Nature].
209. Id. at 48.
210. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 4.
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anemone.” 211 Winston is immediately struck by the coral-laden object, due
to “its apparent uselessness” and uniqueness, and because “the air it seemed
to possess of belonging to an age quite different from the present one.” 212
He keeps the hefty object in his pocket as a fetish, which represents to him a
small chunk of beauty and history that the Party has failed to corrupt. 213
Symbolically, the glass paperweight harkens back to the enlightened
Western world, in which individuals were able to create, enjoy, and
exclusively own works of beautiful art. John Lyons also believes that
Orwell’s use of the image of distorting glass comments on “the isolation of
modern man” and the “sin of power” represented by corrupt government
institutions. 214
Of course, upon Winston’s capture, a member of the Thought Police
finds the paperweight and smashes it into the fireplace, 215 destroying its
aesthetic and symbolic beauty as well as infringing Winston’s rights of
personal property ownership, which is commonplace in totalitarian systems.
Because personal property and IP “share the same conceptual foundations,”
attacks on IP “are in large measure attacks on property itself, even though
they may not be characterized as such or even recognized as such by those
attacking IP.” 216
According to Russian historian, Richard Pipes, the removal of
individual property rights in favor of the concentration of all resources in the
hands of the state not only undermines the work ethic of a nation, but also
inhibits innovation, eventually leading to “the withering of personality, the
prime mover of progress.” 217 This is true, in part, because personal
belongings like the paperweight can be philosophically considered as
extensions of the self: something of the individual owner’s “life spirit”
becomes integrated within them. 218 Deprivation of this personal connection
to creativity can only lead to isolation and a halt on the progress of art and
knowledge, the primary goal of the Progress Clause.
It is, indeed, remarkable that in his symbolic usage of the glass
paperweight, Orwell perfectly predicts the rise of the radical progressives,
who with their DOA mentality have become the contemporary enemies of
both artistic originality and exclusive copyright rights. In a manner similar
to the behavior of Big Brother and other fictional and nonfictional totalitarian
leaders, DOA scholars also push for fewer copyright ownership rights while
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Lyons, supra note 185, at 44.
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they degrade the beauty and inspiration behind genius works of art and
literature from within the canon.
Robert Merges keenly observes the overwhelming academic resistance
to the old-school recognition of discrete, individual authorship and control
of copyright assets, which he describes as “yesterday’s news,” and which the
radical progressives hope will “just wither away in the future.” 219 He decries
that the post-Enlightenment creation of individual rights that had been
afforded to authors in the past
is sharply at odds with prevailing views of creativity today, particularly
those of intellectual property scholars. A primary emphasis in recent
scholarship is the highly social nature of creative production. The general
idea is that the creative person swims in such a rich and stimulating sea of
ideas that it is wrong to celebrate the backstroke or crawl of the individual
racer. 220

According to Merges, the theorists who hail what they label with largely
undefined notions of collective creativity believe that
most movies, novels, nonfiction books, inventions, and product designs
are the result of group creativity that accumulates over many years. From
this perspective, IP rights are seen as artificial legal constructs that often
assign individual ownership on the basis of incomplete and inadequate
understanding of the real essence of the creative enterprise. Individual
vision and effort are at best overrated, and at worst, nothing but dishonest
conceptual constructs employed to serve the interests of powerful
industries. 221

Lior Zemer scripted a recent DOA article that touts this amorphous
group creation concept, definitively claiming that “literature on the
construction of authorship rejects the author-as-creator concept and criticizes
scholarship that discounts the sociality of the creative act.” 222 This new
interpretation of authorship “questions the construction of the self and
emphasizes the role of otherness in creative processes.” 223 Pursuant to this
regime,
. . . authors are required to acknowledge the contribution of other voices
to the emergence and development of their authorial personality while
compromising the degree of their subjective beings. They are required to
embrace the other as a partner rather than a trespasser. That is, authors are
not born authors. They become authors. They are composites. 224

Both ironically and hypocritically, in 2007 Zemer wrote a book entitled
The Idea of Authorship in Copyright Law, which he copyrighted pursuant to
the 1976 Copyright Act of the United States of America. 225 In chapter one
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under the first subheading, “Against Sole Authorship,” Zemer’s first words
of the book state:
Every copyrighted entity represents the creative collectivity. It is a joint
enterprise of both the individual author and the public. Contemporary
conceptions of copyright reject the collective nature of authorial and
artistic creations and invoke copyright to signify entitlement of a certain
kind, to mark an individual territory and disregard its social nature. 226

Although I am a member of Zemer’s stated “public,” I have not been
“acknowledged” by Zemer, who has chosen to “invoke copyright” and
“mark an individual territory.” I imagine that if I were to attempt to sell
Zemer’s book under my name, he would not embrace me “as a partner rather
than a trespasser,” or else he would have published his book utilizing a
copyright-free system such as the Creative Commons. 227
Doris Estelle Long echoes Zemer’s sentiments by the following
observations of the postmodern DOA movement:
Thus, under post-structural analysis, literature is not the result (if it ever
was) of an author’s individuated originality. Instead, it is the result of
intertextuality—of a collaboration between author and reader that goes
beyond the reader merely reading the words selected by another. The
centrality of the reader’s role in the creative process, as the interpreter of
textual meaning, has the potential to tip the balance between author and
the public almost exclusively in favor of the public interest. 228

Such sentiments are perfectly representative of the legal movement to
denigrate and require (as stated twice by Zemer) individual authors—who
are specifically afforded exclusive rights by the Constitution—to
compromise their own being, autonomy, and personality as they accede these
rights to “other voices.” Conveniently, the “others” whom the DOA scholars
purport to protect with their new interpretations of authorship are never
defined. In fact, they cannot ever be defined.
As Pipes reasons, rights can only be afforded to human beings;
therefore, the class rights or social rights of the type defended by the DOA
scholars “are a phantom.” 229 Regardless of this fact, copyright scholars are
determined to make spurious and unsupported claims suggesting the
alternative, stating, for instance, that “Romantic notions such as originality
still persist in the field even though in many cases corporations and other
collective entities are doing the creating.” 230
Pipes warns against the dangers of this modern habit of thinking in
terms of legislating for group, over individual, rights because “just as it can
226. Id. at 1.
227. The Creative Commons is an alternative to the Copyright Act created by copyright professor
Lawrence Lessig (who also ironically publishes his own books under the Copyright Act). In its own
words, Creative Commons is “a global nonprofit organization that enables sharing and reuse of creativity
and knowledge through the provision of free legal tools.” See Peter L. Skolnik, Navigating Social Media
Copyrights, N.J. LAW., October 2013, at 7.
228. Long, supra note 101, at 1189.
229. PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, supra note 217, at 289.
230. Fukumoto, supra note 78, at 903.
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be used to identify those who qualify for special benefits, so it can serve to
single them out for special punishment.” 231 The tyrannical destruction of
Winston’s glass paperweight—and ultimately his own life—represent the
evident repercussions of a system of government that undervalues natural
individual rights and replaces them with untenable, undefinable, and
manifestly unjust collective ownership rights.
D. “2+2=5”: The Loss of Objective Knowledge
In “The Prevention of Literature,” Orwell contends that “[f]reedom of
the intellect means the freedom to report what one has seen, heard, and felt,
and not to be obliged to fabricate imaginary facts and feelings.” 232 In
Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell thematically represents this basic freedom to
speak objective facts by the phrase, “two and two are four.”
Throughout the novel, Winston repeats this mathematical truism—now
considered a “secret doctrine” in Oceania—as he struggles to maintain his
connection to objective reality, and his sanity. 233 The phrase first appears
when Winston strives in Part I to write in his diary and he contemplates how
difficult it is for anyone today to know what life had really been like prior to
the Revolution. 234 He takes out a children’s history book, from which he
reads largely fabricated, propagandist stories in which the former world of
Oceania was depicted as a “miserable place” where children were whipped,
starved, and had no place to sleep:
He picked up the children’s history book and looked at the portrait of Big
Brother which formed its frontispiece. The hypnotic eyes gazed into his
own. It was as though some huge force were pressing down upon you—
something that penetrated inside your skull, battering against your brain,
frightening you out of your beliefs, persuading you, almost, to deny the
evidence of your senses. In the end, the Party would announce that two
and two made five, and you would have to believe it . . . And what was
terrifying was not that they would kill you for thinking otherwise, but that
they might be right. For, after all, how do we know that two and two make
four? Or that the force of gravity works? Or that the past is
unchangeable? 235

This scene illustrates just how effective the propagandist mechanisms
of the Memory Hole and Newspeak had been in confusing and indoctrinating
citizens of Oceania to question objective facts and forget historical events.
It also foreshadows the end of the novel when O’Brien finally and
successfully breaks Winston’s will by brainwashing him not only to speak

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, supra note 217, at 289.
Orwell, Prevention, supra note 141, at 934.
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 230.
Id. at 75.
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 83-84.
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the words “two plus two equals five,” but to actually believe them; and not
only to accept Big Brother, but to actually love him. 236
Orwell—in his typical vatic fashion—also predicts in “The Prevention
of Literature” the universal negation of objective reality that would become
the prominent feature of radical postmodernist thought. He observes that,
“[i]n our age, the idea of intellectual liberty is under attack from . . . its
theoretical enemies, the apologists of totalitarianism” 237 and that
[a] totalitarian society which succeeded in perpetuating itself would
probably set up a schizophrenic system of thought, in which the laws of
common sense held good in everyday life and in certain exact sciences,
but could be disregarded by the politician, the historian, and the
sociologist. Already there are countless people who would think it
scandalous to falsify a scientific textbook, but would see nothing wrong
in falsifying an historical fact. It is at the point where literature and politics
cross that totalitarianism exerts its greatest pressure on the intellectual. 238

The “schizophrenic system” Orwell adroitly predicted in his writings would
begin to take actual shape in the form of French postmodernism some twenty
years later, and snowball across the Western world in the forms of
deconstructionism, cultural relativism, and now—Cancel Culture.
With these writings, Orwell desperately attempted to convince his
fellow intellectuals of the cultural dangers inherent in reconfiguring facts for
political gain and the denial of scientific rationalism and other postEnlightenment principles. All of these basic tenets, however, became
anathema to the radical progressivists, who routinely use tactics such as
2+2=5 to deliberately remove the objective meaning of everything, with
their goal to “destabilize any sense of solidity and meaning and then to use
the ensuing confusion to advance a particular form of radical politics.” 239
Foucault, for example, openly wrote, “it is meaningless to speak in the
Having
name of—or against—Reason, Truth, or Knowledge.” 240
deconstructed these terms and particularly claiming that reason “is the
ultimate language of madness,” the radicals are able to assert their relativistic
ideology that “there is nothing to guide or constrain our thoughts and
feelings. So we can do or say whatever we feel like.” 241 Postmodernism,
according to Hicks, thus becomes a political, activist strategy against the
coalition of reason and power, which seeks not to find the foundation and
conditions of truth, but only to exercise power for the purpose of social
change. 242

236. Id. at 303.
237. Orwell, Prevention, supra note 171, at 931.
238. Id. at 936.
239. James Lindsay, 2+2 Never Equals Five, NEW DISCOURSES (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://newdiscourses.com/2020/08/2-plus-2-never-equals-5/ [https://perma.cc/KCG9-TWWJ ].
240. HICKS, supra note 40, at 2.
241. Id. at 2.
242. Id. at 3.
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Enter the Cancel Culture movement. In late 2019, Seattle Public
Schools released a new draft curriculum aimed at “re-humanising”
mathematics. 243 It suggests that Western math is racist because it has been
used to “oppress and marginalize people of colour” by posing as the only
legitimate expression of mathematical identity and intelligence.244 The
document goes on to ask, “Who gets to say if an answer is right?” and “How
important is it to be right?” 245 One reporter actually chose Orwellian
terminology to comment cynically on the initiative:
Two plus two may equal four, but if the student says five, you better not
correct them, oppressor! Math, in Seattle schools, will become a social
justice course. But that’s not all. The U.S. government will be posited as
a racist institution that must be destroyed. If this is taught to students, it’s
indoctrination at its most destructive. 246

Orwell would have been dismayed—but not surprised—that we have
arrived at a time in which an appreciative number of people are willing to
question the certainties of mathematics, science, and engineering—the
foundational principles of progress in a civilized society. In such a
Foucauldean cloud of confusion, resentment, power struggle, and identity
politics, we know that we are another step closer to an Oceania-like
totalitarian society which, according to Orwell,
demands, in fact, the continuous alteration of the past, and in the long run
probably demands a disbelief in the very existence of objective truth. The
friends of totalitarianism . . . usually tend to argue that since absolute truth
is not attainable, a big lie is no worse than a little lie. It is pointed out that
all historical records are biased and inaccurate, or on the other hand, that
modern physics has proven that what seems to us the real world is an
illusion, so that to believe in the evidence of one’s senses is simply vulgar
philistinism. 247

James Lindsay summaries this phenomenon as follows:

[I]n the conceptual operating system underlying Critical Social Justice
(i.e., Woke) thought, 2+2 might sometimes equal 4, but we have to
understand that accepting this as an objective statement of basic arithmetic
contributes to a system of oppression that, in other corners of its existence,
oppresses racial, gender, and sexual minorities, women, the overweight,
the disabled, and people outside of the “Western context,” which is
accused of accepting statements like “2+2=4” in an “uncritical” way
(which means without using the favored Critical Theory of the relevant
moment). Pause to breathe. The activists behind this really think like this,

243. Catherine Gewertz, Seattle Schools Lead Controversial Push to ‘Rehumanize’ Math,
EDUCATIONWEEKLY (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/seattle-schools-leadcontroversial-push-to-rehumanize-math/2019/10 [https://perma.cc/678U-ZTL4].
244. See Id.
245. Id.
246. Jason Ranz, Seattle Schools document say math is oppressive, US government racist, 770KTTH
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://mynorthwest.com/1537348/rantz-seattle-schools-document-say-math-isoppressive-us-government-racist/? [https://perma.cc/S8FS-4ZDR ].
247. Orwell, Prevention, supra note 171, at 936.
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and one of the weirder battles of the culture war of the day rages around
that fact. 248

Copyright scholars have run rampant with similar Foucauldean
approaches that invariably strive with great aplomb to read white
supremacist power tactics into the concept and meaning of authorship.
Whereas the early legal DOA scholarship focused mainly on changing the
individual nature of creative authorship to one of common, collective
ownership—as discussed in Section II.B–a change has recently occurred.
In step with the mentality of Cancel Culture and an even more
pernicious post-Trump wave of radical progressivism, copyright writers are
now claiming that providing copyright authorship privileges to one group
(the white male) automatically and necessarily disenfranchises
underprivileged minority voices. For example, citing Foucault, John
Tehranian asserts that copyright authorship is
a vehicle through which authority to control narratives and semiotics
passes. And the location of authorship and its attendant rights in one
individual can result in demeaning and devaluing the authorial
contributions of another individual.” 249

By employing the feminist-cinematic metaphor of the “male gaze,” 250 he
claims that, in the absence of significant reform, traditional copyright laws
. . . will continue to empower the male gaze, giving legal bite to a system
of production and rights-vesting that all too frequently reduces women,
indigenous communities, minority racial groups, and the poor to passive
objects in creative works, deprived of agency, operating only in the service
of, and at the behest of, the traditional male mastermind. In a postindustrial society where rights to intellectual, rather than tangible,
property increasingly drive economic wealth and political muscle, we can
no longer afford to ignore the profound implications of copyright’s male
gaze. 251

While the usage of the catchy “male gaze” metaphor may resonate with
radical feminists and other identity-politics ideologues who will nod in
agreement with this and similar statements in Tehranian’s article, it leaves
rational folks who have actually practiced copyright law in the trenches
scratching their heads, asking for both clarification and resolution of these
perceived wrongs. Common to most DOA articles, Tehranian never
provides guidance on the “significant reform” that should occur in order to
make existing copyright regulations more fair or accessible to the allegedly
marginalized groups he broadly references.
248. Lindsay, supra note 239.
249. Tehranian, supra note 68, at 385.
250. Film critic Laura Mulvey coined the term “male gaze” in 1975 “to describe the cinematic angle
of a heterosexual male on a female character.” It has become a familiar cultural perspective, which some
believe to have “significant and pervasive psychological costs for women that they might not even be
aware of.” See Tara Well, Taking Back the Male Gaze: The Secret to Feeling Beautiful and Confident,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY
(Nov.
6,
2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/theclarity/201711/taking-back-the-male-gaze [https://perma.cc/LV5B-WNL3].
251. Tehranian, supra note 68, at 393.
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Similarly, in advocating for a “New Enlightenment” in copyright law
that employs “cultural analysis” and “cultural theory” (both undefined)
Madhavi Sunder claims that
under a cultural analysis, law would want to ensure that all individuals—
not just the most powerful—would have access to the channels of making
cultural meaning. A cultural theory of intellectual property recognizes not
only the symbiotic relationship between technology and intellectual
property, but also views intellectual property—including its technology
policy—within a context of cultural development and social movements,
from the rise of identity politics to the elaboration of Knowledge Societies
and the rumblings of a New Enlightenment. 252

Again, Sunder’s article slings together all the popular phrases and feel-good
multiculturalist terminology. Yet, it leaves the reader wondering what a
regime that views IP “within a context of cultural development and social
movements” would look like or, even more importantly, exactly how the
current copyright regime fails these charges.
More disturbingly, both authors conveniently fail to communicate the
fact that copyright rights are available today to all authors no matter their
gender, race, creed, or color and—most importantly—the message or
meaning they convey. Unlike obtaining a patent or even a trademark, which
requires specialized knowledge and lengthy and expensive registration
processes, the Copyright Act of 1976 made federal protection of works of
authorship automatic upon fixation. 253 The standard of originality required
for copyright protection is also very low, requiring only a “modicum of
creativity,” 254 which is never judged by a proscribed or legalized aesthetic
style or taste. 255
Copyright, thus, is decidedly not the zero-sum game that Tehranian and
Sunder suggest. The truth is far from it. If a million white men secure
copyrights for their creations, so can ten, twenty, or forty million women and
minorities do the same with respect to their own works as long as they are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression, original, and independently
created. 256 Cooper and May have observed that when copyrights (as well as
patents) are granted
Others remain free to create and invent as they so choose. The liberty of
prospective authors and inventors to offer their own creations and
252. Sunder, supra note 48, at 332.
253. Lydia Pallas Loren, Fixation As Notice in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 939, 940 (2016)
(“today [fixation] is the only remaining required indication of the content of the author’s expressive work
to which copyright protection may attach.”).
254. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-6 (1991).
255. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (holding that that a
circus advertisement and other alleged forms of low art could be copyrighted alongside fine art because
“[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations”).
256. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 428 (6th ed. 2014) (“A work
is copyrightable if original and independently created, even though it is identical to another copyrighted
work.”).
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inventions as competing alternatives is limited only by their own creative
and inventive resources and by the limited rights of original authors and
inventors. 257

At the same time, the profitability and popularity of creative works is
determined by marketplace factors in a free economy outside of the realm
and legal dictates of copyright law. 258 It is unfortunate, but not uncommon,
that neither Tehranian nor Sunder even attempt to explain in their articles
exactly whose rights would be demeaned and devalued and how exactly nonwhite/non-males are deprived from the spoils of creation, or copyright. It is,
though, abundantly clear that, employing a postmodern lens, the scholars aim
to spark with their words and sentiments an unresolvable and
phantasmagoric struggle, covertly exacerbating existing tension and
animosity among various groups along lines of gender and race.
Writing along similar lines, Xiyin Tang so regrets the presence of
canonical works written by white males (and even white females), that she
takes this line of unreasoned scholarship a step further to claim that the
reason they have prestigious status “is because they depend on privileging
one set of dominant social ideals over another.” 259 Her solution? In order to
“hijack” those works and take back power for the marginalized females and
minorities, the white male textual sites of domination and oppression must
first be emptied out of meaning—excavated, in effect—and then filled, this
time with the voice of the oppressed. 260
Tang further maintains, “[w]ithout the violent appropriation of the
oppressor’s work, the shock value of both the new work and the message
behind the taking would be lost.” 261 Again, it is unclear what this string of
sentences means for the actual practice of copyright law and within the real
world, but the disdain for the individual author from this student writer sadly
rings loud and clear. And so does her undercurrent that encourages a
metaphorical, yet ideologically dangerous, form of violence against the
perceived enemies of the allegedly oppressed voices she claims to represent.
When their instructors spew such venom, and irresponsibly condone
violence for the “shock value” effect of spreading their Marxist ideologies,
it is no wonder that today 64% of college students agree that the rioting,
looting, and burning of thousands of businesses across the nation in 2020
(and continuing into 2021) is justified to some degree. 262 With their never257. COOPER & MAY, supra note 38, at 56.
258. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation Ratchet, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 591, 606 (2019) (noting that copyright “is facially neutral when it comes to creators’
identities and the genre of their work. Its incentives and protections are purely economic, and explicitly
unconcerned with the identities of creators and the quality or genre of their work.”).
259. Xiyin Tang, That Old Thing, Copyright . . .: Reconciling the Postmodern Paradox in the New
Digital Age, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 71, 98 (2011).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Brad Palumbo, 65% of College Students Say Rioting and Looting is ‘Justified,’ New Poll Finds,
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Oct. 28, 2021), https://fee.org/articles/65-of-college-students-
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ending claims of oppression by hegemonic narratives, the radical progressive
academics seek to rewrite facts and subvert truths. Moreover, any reasoning
that objectively disproves the truth and correctness of their assertions must
“be deconstructed by rhetorical tricks and marginalized by moral and,
perhaps, physical force and intimidation.” 263
E. “Doublethink”: The Abuse of Language for Political Gain
One common rhetorical trick used by politicians and academics, and
abhorred by Orwell, was their abuse of language to confuse and obfuscate
meaning. Orwell was a passionate believer in the responsibility of the writer
“to make accessible to the ordinary intelligent reader ideas and analysis
however strange or difficult.” 264 He routinely chastised academic writing for
reveling in unclear and ambiguous language that is difficult to read and
understand, with the hopes that if readers find the writing to be obscure, they
will also believe it is necessarily profound. 265
Based on Orwell’s astute and brave observations in his articles, he
demonstrates in Nineteen Eighty-Four how Ingsoc abuses language to
indoctrinate the citizens of Oceania into a collective mindset that leaves them
groping for truth and even questioning their own good judgment. This
phenomenon is accomplished in “the labyrinthine world of doublethink,”
which Winston describes in the beginning of the novel:
To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while
telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions
which canceled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in
both of them; to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while lying
claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party
was the guardian of democracy; to forget whatever it was necessary to
forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was
needed, and then promptly to forget it again: and above all, to apply the
same process to the process itself. That was the ultimate subtlety:
consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become
unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to
understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink. 266

Doublethink is achieved by the elimination of the logic that is inherent
in the English language, and its replacement with Newspeak, which creates
words having two mutually contradictory meanings, such as blackwhite. 267
Blackwhite, when applied to an opponent, means “the habit of impudently
say-rioting-and-looting-is-justified-new-poll-finds/ [https://perma.cc/YZB8-HGJ7] (The poll was
conducted by Mclaughlin & Associate in conjunction with Yale University’s conservative William F.
Buckley Program. It surveyed a nationally representative sample of 800 college students on a wide array
of issues, from the coronavirus to race in America).
263. Lindsay, supra note 239.
264. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 3.
265. Id.
266. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 37-38.
267. Id at 221.
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claiming that black is white, in contradiction of the plain facts,” but when it
is applied to a Party member,
it means a loyal willingness to say that black is white when Party discipline
demands this. But it means also the ability to believe that black is white,
and more, to know that black is white, and to forget that one has ever
believed the contrary. This is a continuous alteration of the past, made
possible by the system of thought which really embraces all the rest, and
which is known in Newspeak as doublethink. 268

Thematically, doublethink is the literary mechanism Orwell uses in
Nineteen Eighty-Four to serve as the culmination of all of the most insidious
tactics of Big Brother to reduce humanity to a collective, thoughtless mass
of pliant and obedient automatons: the Memory Hole, Newspeak, 2+2=5,
and Two Minutes Hate (discussed in Section IV.F). For, if a totalitarian
regime can successfully alter thought by the widespread use and acceptance
of manipulative and essentially meaningless language, it then holds the key
to unleashing its unlimited power.
In “Politics and the English Language,” another classic essay Orwell
wrote prior to Nineteen Eighty-Four, he catalogues what he considered the
modern vices of language which produced “a stagnant and stifling mental
atmosphere in which thought is commonly replaced with the automatic
recitation of certain prescribed words or phrases ‘tacked together.” 269 Here
Orwell discusses a theme that runs through much of his body of literature,
including Nineteen Eighty-Four: the intentional use of vague and subversive
language by academics and ruling political parties to hide rather than express
the truth in order to gain power and/or enlist followers. Underneath such
tactics lie “the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not
an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.” 270
In this essay, Orwell keenly observes how inattentive and sloppy
writing has maligned the English language to the point where it has become
“ugly and inaccurate,” making it “easier for us to have foolish thoughts.” 271
Claiming that modern English is “full of bad habits which spread by
imitation,” Orwell cites five examples of prose written by professors and
journalists (and one from a pro-communist pamphlet). After dissecting the
passages for their rabid inaccuracies, Orwell observes:
Each of these passages has faults of its own, but, quite apart from
avoidable ugliness, two qualities are common to all of them. The first is
staleness of imagery; the other is lack of precision. The writer either has a
meaning and cannot express it, or he inadvertently says something else, or
he is almost indifferent as to whether his words mean anything or not. This
mixture of vagueness and sheer incompetence is the most marked
268. Id.
269. HICKS, supra note 40, at 167-68 (emphasis in original) (quoting Orwell in “Politics and the
English Language”).
270. George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in GEORGE ORWELL: ESSAYS 954, 954-967
(Peter Davison, ed., 2002) [hereinafter, Politics].
271. Id.
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characteristic of modern English prose, and especially of any kind of
political writing. As soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts
into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are
not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake
of their meaning, and more and more of phrases tacked together like the
sections of a prefabricated hen-house. 272

Orwell provides examples of how both thought can corrupt language,
and language can corrupt thought, maintaining that “[a] bad usage can spread
by tradition and imitation, even among people who should and do know
better.” 273 He cites examples of obscure and shoddy prose (and how readily
accepted such could be), but he was even more concerned how easily writers
have come “to deliberately pass off one thing as another, or to hide bad
reasoning in a rhetorical fog.” 274 An intensely practical man, Orwell was
also highly critical of academic language that “lacks the necessary specificity
to actually tell anyone what they should to in any real-world
circumstance.” 275
i.

How the Radical Postmodernists use Doublethink to
Perpetuate the Death of the Author Trope

The usage of doublethink—and its corollary, doublespeak—is essential
not only to the goals of Ingsoc in Orwell’s novel, but also to the
eternalization of the largely incoherent writing used by the postmodernist
French theorists who heralded the DOA movement. I myself had not read
or studied Barthes or Foucault until I recently embarked upon my graduate
studies in English Literature. I recall reading the convoluted ideas and
indecipherable sentences in both “The Death of the Author” (Barthes) and
“What is an Author” (Foucault) over and again, confusedly feeling like I
needed to enroll in a remedial course in theory to untangle what it was I
simply could not grasp in the postmodernist writings that are all the rage in
academia. Here is a shining example, cited frequently by copyright scholars,
from “What is an Author”:
the author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by
which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which
one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free
composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we
are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging
of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the
opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product,
since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function.
When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inserts it,
one has an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 956-957.
Id. at 964.
WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 168.
Id. at 169.
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figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation
of meaning. 276

Concomitantly, this exact language is reduplicated, yet never fully
explained, in countless law review articles discussing the legal ramifications
of the putative death of the copyright author. 277 However, even selfproclaimed anarchist Kristian Williams admits, “if a sentence cannot be
translated from anarcho-English into plain English, there is a very good
chance that it is meaningless.” 278
On further investigation into my frustrating and perplexing experience
with modern French theory, I was relieved to find that a host of contemporary
journalists and scholars—many of whom are intentionally not studied at
university—was beginning to expose postmodernism as “intellectual
terrorism masquerading as faux-profundity,” as described by Gad Saad. 279
Examining the same attributes of Marxist-leaning intellectuals as Orwell did
in “Politics and the English Language,” Saad explains that the reason why
postmodernism thrives in academia is “because of the assumption that if
something is nearly impossible to understand, it must be profound.” 280 To
buttress his assertion, Saad recounts an actual conversation between
Foucault and an American philosopher in which Foucault actually admitted
that “[i]n France, you gotta have ten percent incomprehensible, otherwise
people won’t think it’s deep—they won’t think you’re a profound
thinker.” 281
I was, and remain, astounded by the fact that countless academics
blindly follow such a narcissistic person who would intentionally mangle the
English language in order to seem profound, and then glibly admit to doing
so. In a recent article unpacking the “bewildering theory” of postmodernism,
Helen Pluckrose eloquently explains the conundrum as follows:
The irrational and identarian “symptoms” of postmodernism are easily
recognizable and much criticized, but the ethos underlying them is not
well understood. This is partly because postmodernists rarely explain
themselves clearly and partly because of the inherent contradictions and
inconsistencies of a way of thought which denies a stable reality or reliable
knowledge to exist. 282

As the mystery of why I seemed unable to grasp either the substantive
meaning or purpose of the early DOA writings began to unravel, I dug more
276. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author? in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITICISM, 141 (Josue V. Harari ed., 1979).
277. See, e.g., David Lange, At Play in the Field of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of
Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 143 (1992); Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward A Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1996); and Tehranian, supra note 68, at 385.
278. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 175.
279. GAD SAAD, THE PARASITIC MIND: HOW INFECTIOUS IDEAS ARE KILLING COMMON SENSE 75
(2020).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Pluckrose, supra note 82.
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into the personal background of Foucault, who had become the darling
prophet of copyright academicians across the country. Sadly, I found that he
was a very troubled soul.
Coincidentally, during the writing of this section of my article, I was
shocked to read a breaking story that French-American intellectual Guy
Sorman told Britain’s The Sunday Times that he witnessed Foucault—one of
the most cited academics in the world—sexually abusing children as young
as eight-years-old while he lived in Tunisia during the 1960s. 283 In addition
to this claim, Sorman said that
[d]espite Foucault’s self-professed Marxist leanings . . . his behavior in
real life was indicative of French elitism, noting that Foucault ‘believed
there were two morals, one for the elite, which was immoral, and one for
the people, which should be restrictive.’ 284

Sorman’s allegation, while not yet proven, is consistent with the fact that
Foucault signed a petition in 1977 along with Barthes and their other radical
postmodernist friends, which sought to legalize sexual relations with
children aged 13 or above in France. 285 The petition stated, in part, that
“children and adolescents have the right to a sexual life.” 286 It is not
surprising that I had to dig deeply to find the facts surrounding Sorman’s
claim because none of the mainstream media outlets covered it. What is
surprising is that contemporary academics nonetheless continue to worship
Foucault and his destructive philosophies.
I learned further from Jordan Peterson’s 287 body of work—for which I
remain wholly thankful for and indebted to—that the French postmodernists
I continue to struggle with (now, in so many ways) were indeed “powerfully

283. Kurt Zindulka, Woke Philosopher Michel Foucault Raped 8-Year-Old Children in Tunisian
Cemeteries: Claim, BREITBART (March, 29, 2021), https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2021/03/29/wokehero-philosopher-michel-foucault-raped-children-as-young-as-8-years-old/
[https://perma.cc/JP9Y3QQR].
284. Id.
285. Guy Sorman Accuses Michel Foucault of Abusing Boys in Tunisia, DAILY SABA (March 30,
2021),
https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/guy-sorman-accuses-michel-foucault-of-abusing-boys-intunisia/news [https://perma.cc/4GP7-TF6K].
286. Marie Doezema, France, Where Age of Consent is up for Debate, THE ATLANTIC (March 10,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/frances-existential-crisis-over-sexualharassment-laws/550700/ [https://perma.cc/D8LJ-T5L2].
287. Jordan B. Peterson is a Canadian psychology professor at the University of Toronto and former
Harvard professor and clinical psychologist. In the 2010s, he began to receive worldwide attention for
his in-class and public criticism of radical postmodernist ideological views and for his supposedly
conservative agenda, which espouses inspirational guidelines for living a responsible, goal-oriented,
productive life as opposed to living an existence of victimhood. His two books, 12 Rules for Life: An
Anecdote to Chaos and Beyond Order: 12 More Rules for Life, have been consistently misunderstood,
mischaracterized, and maligned by academia and the mainstream media for allegedly espousing whitemale “patriarchal” viewpoints. See, e.g, Nellie Bowles, Jordan Peterson, Custodian of the Patriarchy,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/style/jordan-peterson-12rules-for-life.html [https://perma.cc/9RXD-TU6Y]; and Kelefa Sanneh, Jordan Peterson’s Gospel of
Masculinity,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(Feb.
26,
2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/05/jordan-petersons-gospel-of-masculinity
[https://perma.cc/6NQN-FRFS].
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influenced by Marx.” 288 Peterson observes how Foucault and the other
radicals linguistically and intentionally disguised their continuing loyalty to
a new brand of Marxist ideology that essentially replaces “economics” with
“power” as the primary motivating force behind all human behavior. 289 In
the writings of Stephen R.C. Hicks, I uncovered even more about Foucault’s
state of mind as expressed in one of his own essays in which he
speaks almost longingly about the coming erasure of mankind: Man is ‘an
invention of recent date’ that will soon ‘be erased, like a face drawn in
sand at the edge of the sea.’ 290

It then occurred to me why I had been so unable to put my finger on
what I similarly was never able to understand about the DOA theories that
were popping up like bad pennies in scholarship analyzing copyright
authorship. I realized my colleagues had fully been taken in by, and aligned
themselves with, these Marxist-leaning faux-Foucauldean theories. Over and
again in their scholarship they boldly and confidently re-cited Foucault (and
each other) as if the dour claim of the dead author had been fully vetted,
verified, accepted, and even had become sacrosanct.
ii.

The Effect of Postmodernist Doublethink on Copyright

Due to the vast proliferation of the DOA scholarship, Foucault’s overt
collectivist theories have been surreptitiously inserted into the scholarly
conversation about copyright authorship by way of persistence rather than
objective or rational proof, as described by Helprin:
Taken for fact, misconception builds upon previous misconception until
what emerges is the result of a high-speed game of telephone among
thousands (or tens or hundreds of thousands) of people, in which
responsibility to the truth is considered met if one has read something
somewhere that say something close to what one will now further
distort. 291

Indeed, within my extensive DOA research, I observed that over the last few
decades it has become an accepted truth in the academy that Foucault and
his band of French theorists have “proven” that the author is dead.
Recently, Fukumoto took the DOA conversation to a new level,
theorizing that “[c]opyright law’s reliance on the author conception becomes
increasingly problematic if one considers the artistic and intellectual trends
that view the ‘author’ as a social construct.” 292 He boldly maintains that
“[t]he historical claim that the author ideology was the product of a particular
epoch leads to the general philosophical point that authors as originators do

288. JORDAN B. PETERSON, BEYOND ORDER: 12 MORE RULES FOR LIFE 173 (2021) [hereinafter
BEYOND ORDER].
289. Id.
290. HICKS, supra note 40, at 195.
291. HELPRIN, supra note 52, at 41.
292. Fukumoto, supra note 78, at 910.
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not exist now and indeed never existed.” 293 He attempts to justify his cavalier
dismissal of thousands of years of human creativity and originality by
arguing that
The post-structuralist attack on the author is part of a more sweeping
criticism of the concepts of a subject, an individual, a consciousness, a
method, and a meaning. Each of these concepts is a philosophical fiction
that has its uses, but that post-structuralists see as having no existence prior
to its social construction. Each post-structuralist has a different way of
dealing with or discarding these now-discredited concepts. 294

The most disheartening section of this article, though, is the following
observation of Derrida’s motive in deconstructing the author, which
Fukumoto enthusiastically embraces:
Derrida’s work . . . provides the most thorough and sweeping
philosophical justification for undermining the concept of the author,
individual, or consciousness. He tries to show that the tradition of Western
thought since Plato depends upon such concepts as truth, presence,
substance, subject, “consciousness, God, man, and so forth.”
“Deconstruction” is the name of the project to undermine these concepts.
Deconstruction does not mean destroying the structure of Western
thought. That may indeed be the eventual goal, but it cannot be achieved
all at once. Instead, deconstruction seeks to weaken the structure by
employing the tools of Western thinking against itself . . . 295

Fukumoto essentially praises Derrida for his attacks on authorial
originality “through his sweeping denial that human consciousness, as a nonlinguistic, non-material entity, produces language.” 296 Now that students of
the DOA scholars such as Fukumoto routinely accept and regurgitate such
ridiculous notions that the canon of great Western literature was not created
by the minds of individual, original, and in many cases genius authors, but
from some other vague, undescribed phantom scriber, the ground for doing
away with copyright altogether has certainly been well laid.
Still, the question that has haunted me during the past couple decades
during which I have studied copyright and the DOA syndrome is similar to
the one that perplexes Winston throughout Nineteen Eighty-Four when
pondering the motives behind the soulless and evil policies of Big Brother:
Why?
I understand the need for copyright balance and equity, and even
substantial reform to better accommodate the complexities inherent in our
digitally driven creative culture. But why are DOA scholars—from Foucault
to Fukumoto—so insistent on negating, maligning, and finally killing the
figure who makes the progress of creativity, art, and beauty possible in the
first place? That is the question to be explored in the last and most poignant

293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
Id. at 912-13.
Id. at 914-15.
Id. at 916.
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and terrifying of Orwell’s themes in Nineteen Eighty-Four: “Two Minutes
Hate.”
F. “Two Minutes Hate”: Power and the Destruction of
Progress
Throughout the novel, the Party subjects Winston and his fellow
workers in the Records Department of the Ministry of Truth to a daily ritual
called Two Minutes Hate, a propagandist tactic used by Big Brother to keep
the citizens committed to publicly extoling Ingsoc and reviling Goldstein,
the scapegoat who is dubbed The Enemy of the People. 297 Goldstein’s face
appears on the telescreen for two minutes to remind the citizens of Oceania
that
[h]e was the primal traitor, the earliest defiler of the Party’s purity. All
subsequent crimes against the Party, all treacheries, acts of sabotage,
heresies, deviations, sprang directly out of his teaching. 298

The distinguishing characteristic of Orwell’s Two Minutes Hate—a
daily intake of visceral denial of all things anti-Ingsoc—is that it slowly
builds the citizens of Oceania up into a “frenzy,” which makes it impossible
for them to avoid joining in the chaos:
A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to
smash faces in with a sledgehammer, seemed to flow through the whole
group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one’s
will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic. And yet the rage one felt was an
abstract, undirected emotion which could be switched from one object to
another like the flame of a blowlamp. 299

Toward the end of the two minutes, the citizens work themselves into a
slow, deep chanting of “B-B!. . ..B-B!” 300 Winston describes this ritual as
“an act of self-hypnosis, a deliberate drowning of consciousness by means
of rhythmic noise that is “curiously savage.” 301
Orwell’s inspiration for Two Minutes Hate was undoubtedly influenced
by the actual propagandist practices that had occurred during the twentieth
century during which Orwell wrote. Unlike Western democracies, which are
generally antipathetic to the whole idea of propaganda, film propaganda was
an important and visible weapon used in the totalitarian governments of

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18 (the initials of Big Brother).
Id. at 18-19.
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Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany for political indoctrination and social
control. 302 Moreover, it remains so in the Communist Party of China. 303
Indeed, totalitarian governments recognize that propaganda played an
important role in their revolutionary struggles.304 Thus—similar to the
Ministry of Truth in Nineteen Eighty-Four—they established centralized
state apparatuses for the dissemination of political propaganda: the People’s
Commissariat for Enlightenment in Soviet Russia and the Ministry for
Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment in Nazi Germany. 305
Orwell introduces Two Minutes Hate early in the novel as the literary
mechanism by which he later reveals the Party’s true motives for obliterating
its democratic society and creating such a hellish and bleak society as
Oceania in its stead. As Winston wonders whether he is a lunatic as he
contemplates the reasons behind his strong desire to chronicle the dire story
of his existence in Oceania in his diary, he describes his confusion regarding
the motives of Big Brother:
What most affected him with the sense of nightmare was that he had never
clearly understood why the huge imposture was undertaken. The
immediate advantages of falsifying the past were obvious, but the ultimate
motive was mysterious. He took up his pen again and wrote: I understand
HOW: I do not understand WHY. 306

When Winston finally has a chance to begin reading the book midway
through Nineteen Eighty-Four, he is about to peruse the section that reveals
the ultimate purpose of Ingsoc:
Here we reach the central secret. As we have seen, the mystique of the
Party . . . depends upon doublethink. But deeper than this lies the original
motive, the never-questioned instinct that first led to the seizure of power
and brought doublethink, the Thought Police, continuous warfare and all
the other necessary paraphernalia into existence afterwards. This motive
really consists . . . 307

Maddeningly for the reader (or at least, this reader), Winston is interrupted
from his reading before the central secret is revealed to either him or
Orwell’s readers.

302. James Chapman, Review Article: The Power of Propaganda, 35 J. OF CONTEMP. HIST. 679, 680
(2000). (Reviewed Work(s): Britain’s Secret Propaganda War 1948-1977 by Paul Lashmar and James
Oliver: Foward Soviet! History and Non-Fiction Film in the USSR by Graham Roberts: European Culture
in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914-1918 by Aviel Roshwald and Richard
Stites: Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany by Richard Taylor).
303. Emma Sun, Propaganda Films to Dominate Chinese Theaters in Anniversary Year, VARIETY
(June 16, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://variety.com/2019/film/asia/propaganda-films-dominate-chinesetheaters-in-anniversary-year-1203245115/ [https://perma.cc/AR45-75Y5]; Clarissa Sebag Montefiore,
How China Distorts its Minorities Through Propaganda, BBC (Dec. 15, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20131215-how-china-portrays-its-minorities
[https://perma.cc/5KLP-A5RB].
304. Chapman, supra note 302, at 680.
305. Id.
306. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 83 (emphasis in original).
307. Id. at 226.
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Orwell finally unveils Ingsoc’s agenda at the end of the novel, just as
O’Brien is about to break Winston’s spirit and convert him into the
Brotherhood. Aware that Winston has been reading a copy of the book,
O’Brien compels him to state why it is that Ingsoc clings to power. Savagely
beaten down both physically and spiritually, Winston contemplates his
response to O’Brien’s inquiry:
He knew in advance what O’Brien would say. That the Party did not seek
power for its own ends, but only for the good of the majority. That it
sought power because men in the mass were frail cowardly creatures who
could not endure liberty or face the truth and must be ruled over and
systematically deceived by others who were stronger than themselves. 308

The surprising and shocking reveal of the novel follows with O’Brien’s
reply:
Now I will tell you the answer to my question. It is this. The Party seeks
power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of
others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long
life or happiness; only power, pure power. 309

O’Brien continues by informing Winston that once Ingsoc fully institutes all
its power-hungry stratagems, all characteristics of life previously known to
Western democracy would end: there would be no wives and no friends;
children will be taken from their mothers at birth; the sex instinct will be
eradicated; there will exist no loyalty, no love, and no laughter. 310
But most importantly for the purposes of copyright law, in Ingsoc,
“[t]here will be no art, no literature, no science.” 311 Indeed, the entire postEnlightenment, natural-rights inspired conception of Progress that our
constitutional Framers and other Western democracies set in motion will be
turned entirely on its head, as O’Brien informs Winston:
Progress in our world will be progress towards more pain. The old
civilisations claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours is
founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear,
rage, triumph and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy—
everything. 312

With the Memory Hole and Newspeak, the Party had already begun to bring
the achievements of great thinkers in line with the philosophies of Ingsoc:
Various writers, such as Shakespeare, Milton, Swift, Byron, Dickens and
some others were therefore in process of translation: when the task had
been completed, their original writings, with all else that survived of the
literature of the past, would be destroyed. These translations were a slow
and difficult business, and it was not expected that they would be finished
before the first or second decade of the twenty-first century. 313

In other words, right now!
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
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And right now in the real world, thanks to Cancel Culture even George
Orwell himself may find himself on the chopping block (he would not be
surprised) as the radical progressives invent more and new ways every day
to suppress viewpoints not in keeping with their collectivist and often
Marxist agendas. 314 The most important recent development along these
lines for the Cancel Culture warriors is the charge of “cultural
appropriation,” in which writers and artists from majority or “powerholding” cultures are forbidden to engage with topics, themes, styles, or
attitudes of cultural groups to which they do not belong, particularly those of
minority or oppressed cultures. 315
For example, in Oregon, a group of radical progressives recently
created a social media listing of restaurants that should be canceled because
their owners are white, yet they are serving Asian, Latin, African, and Indian
cuisine. 316 The unnamed and anonymous group claims that the white-owned
restaurants “hamper the ability for POC [people of color] to run successful
businesses of their own (cooking their own cuisines) by either consuming
market share with their attempt at authenticity or by modifying foods to
market to white palates.” 317
The Portland Mercury published an article about two white women who
established a burrito truck business after visiting Mexico, falling in love with
the authentic food, and attempting to reverse engineer the recipes they
encountered there. 318 Hostile commentators “trashed the pair,” claiming it
was “the latest example of white folks profiting off the labor of people of
color,” and slamming their actions as “intellectual property theft.” 319
Sadly, the culture bullies managed to prevail as the successful business
went under. 320 Orwell’s brand of exhibiting power only for the sake of power
is now present and reaping consequences in the real world. Doubtless,
Foucault and his band of postmodern theorists would have approved of such
a hate-inspired move—pitting one cultural group against another in the name
of power—but copyright professors surely understand that the IP theft
allegations for reverse engineering common recipes mentioned in the article
are preposterous and meritless, right?
Wrong. Copyright scholars today are also in the habit of admonishing
similar acts of cultural appropriation, defined in legal terms as the “taking
from a culture that is not one’s own, intellectual property, cultural

314. See Stewart, supra note 20.
315. Id.
316. Robby Soave, White-Owned Restaurants Shamed for Serving Ethnic Food: It’s Cultural
Appropriation, REASON (May 23, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://reason.com/2017/05/23/someone-created-alist-of-ethnic-restaur/ [https://perma.cc/F9TA-2SFW].
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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expressions and artifacts, history and ways of knowledge.” 321 Another
explanation of cultural appropriation is “the act of taking some product from
a ‘source community’ culture and repurposing it in a different culture.” 322
More recent law review articles openly frame cultural appropriation
within a Foucauldean power lens. The authors of these articles suggest that
the earlier definitions of the term “miss the component of dominance,” and
should incorporate the sentiment that “the culture that is appropriating
something is usually in a position of higher power in contrast with the culture
whose idea is being appropriated.” 323
Let me be abundantly clear. It is, of course, rational and meritorious to
advocate for the protection of IP products created by people from Indigenous
cultures. However, it is not admirable to do so at the expense of Western
cultures that have a developed body of copyright laws, which have worked
for centuries to protect original works.
It is true that aspects of Indigenous cultural property protections (or lack
thereof) theoretically conflict with the legal requirements of Western
copyright laws, such as originality and fixation. 324 It is also rational to
observe that real appropriation of cultural artifacts occurs to the detriment of
Indigenous societies. In fact, those working in international IP organizations
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization continue to take
important steps to increase awareness of the gaps in IP protection for many
Indigenous societies. 325 Similarly, many serious scholars like my friend and
colleague Dalindyebo Shabalala continue to advance workable solutions to
bridge the gap between Westernized notions of original, fixed, exclusive
individual copyright ownership with those of Indigenous practices that are
more group oriented, non-commercial, and non-fixed. 326
Unfortunately, though, other scholars use this platform not to offer
practical, all-inclusive, and globally equitable solutions, but instead to
clandestinely pit Western cultures against Indigenous cultures in a no-win,
identity-politics-driven war for power. It is also not helpful, for example,
when scholars write articles that tally and highlight the racial and cultural
differences between defendants in infringement cases, which only serve to
exacerbate racial tension and detract from the myriad of complex legal issues

321. Olga Bryana Gonzalez, Cultural Appropriation: The Native American Artist Struggle for
Intellectual Property Protection in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 42 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1,
21 (2019).
322. Id. at 20.
323. Id.
324. Stuart Schüssel, Copyright Protection’s Challenges and Alaska Natives’ Cultural Property, 29
ALASKA L. REV. 313, 314, 325 (2012).
325. Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property, at 317.
326. See, generally, Dalindyebo Bafana Shabalala, Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge,
and Traditional Cultural Expressions in Native American Tribal Codes, 51 AKRON L. REV. 1125, 1128
(2017).
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that drive the results in these difficult and often novel cases of first
impression. 327
The scholarly persistence upon Foucauldean notions of power and
resentment pervade this issue, and inexorably lead to the common result that
people from both cultures lose out, as “the doctrine of group identity
inevitably ends with everyone identified as a class enemy, an oppressor: with
everyone uncleansibly [sic] contaminated by bourgeois privilege.” 328 Like
Orwell, Jordan Peterson warns of the lure toward such ideologies:
Beware of intellectuals who make a monotheism out of their theories of
motivation. Beware, in more technical terms, of blanket univariate (single
variable) causes for diverse, complex problems . . . The attraction of doing
so is, however, obvious: simplicity, ease, and the illusion of mastery
(which can have exceptionally useful psychological and social
consequences) . . . and let us not forget, the frequent discovery of a villain,
or set of villains, upon which the hidden motivations for the ideology can
be vented. 329

Observing that diversity is so highly regarded today on campuses,
Charles Russo maintains that as important as diversity is, faculty members
also have the duty to “help teach students to move beyond such personal
characteristics as race, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation to embrace
intellectual diversity instead demonizing ‘the other.’” 330
Radical progressive scholars, on the other hand, contradictorily believe
that, although Western authors should have extremely narrowed (if not
nonexistent) rights of exclusion, the creative content of Indigenous peoples
should be afforded expansive and even special protection. For example,
copyright scholars routinely reprimand Western authors for attempts to
privatize common elements in the public domain, such as unfixed
vocalizations, simple chord formations and lyrics, yet they advocate for
“stronger intellectual property protections for Native American tribes and
individuals” for similar content because “their culture, languages, and
creations are inextricably intertwined with their cultural survival.” 331

327. See e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 258, at 631-32 (comparing the races and music styles of digital
sampling defendants—N.W.A. on the one hand and Madonna on the other—in cases that form a circuit
split on de minimis copyright infringement and maintaining this shows how hip-hop musicians have
“borne the stigma of copyright devaluation” thus “feed[ing] a narrative under which dominant culture’s
appropriation of minority and indigenous cultures is portrayed as groundbreaking, edifying, or archivally
valuable, and minority artists’ appropriation of dominant culture is portrayed as lazy or uncreative”). See
also, HELEN PLUCKROSE & JAMES LINDSAY, CYNICAL THEORIES: HOW ACTIVIST SCHOLARSHIP MADE
EVERYTHING ABOUT RACE, GENDER, AND IDENTITY-AND WHY THIS HARMS EVERYBODY 224 (2020)
(providing a similar example of how feminist and activist scholars have tediously measured the number
of words spoken by women as compared to men in films, and arguing that such “uncharitable” approaches
are “both highly interpretive and unfalsifiable”).
328. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-56 (Thomas P. Whitney &
Harry Wiletts trans., Edward E. Ericson, Jr. abridged., Jordan B. Peterson, foreward) xviii (1985).
329. PETERSON, BEYOND ORDER, supra note 288, at 174.
330. Charles J. Russo, “Trigger Warnings, Safe Spaces, and Free Speech: Lessons from the United
States,” International Journal of Law & Education, Vol. 22, pp. 4-17 (2019).
331. Gonzalez, supra note 321, at 9.
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Conveniently, neither side of the equation wins in these scenarios. The
Oregonian women are publicly shamed into shutting down their burrito truck
by journalists; the citizens of the city lose an opportunity to enjoy authentic
Mexican food and perhaps learn a little about a country they have never
visited, which invariably harms the Mexican culture at the end of the day. It
is unbelievable—truly remarkable, in fact—that Orwell predicted the very
type of events and sentiments that today motivate the Cancel Culture and
Cancel [©opyright] Culture warriors, which he claimed would be “tolerated
and even defended by people who considered themselves enlightened and
progressive.” 332
Fortunately, other contemporary authors are brave enough to expose the
hidden Marxist motivations of our Cancel Culture society. Journalist Robby
Soave poignantly cuts through the veneer of the hateful culture warriors in
Oregon when he claims that
One understands the desire for respect and a fair chance to represent one’s
own culture, but cultural practices are not zero-sum entities. They cannot
be stolen or exhausted. The real goal of cultural appropriation charges
seems to be to induce a permanent cultural cringe, to create a version of
cultural crimestop, the Party-induced state of mind in [Orwell’s] 1984. 333

In his forward to the officially abridged version of Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago, 334 Jordan Peterson similarly shows
that, if one studies the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, it is
apparent that their goal was to “remake man and woman,” with the “longing
to restructure the human spirit in the very image of the Communist
preconceptions.” 335 Peterson keenly notes that the Soviets
tortured, thieved, imprisoned, lied and betrayed, all the while masking
their great evil with virtue. It was Solzhenitsyn and The Gulag
Archipelago that tore off the mask, and exposed the feral cowardice, envy,
deceit, resentment, and hatred for the individual and for existence itself
that pulsed beneath. 336

Peterson further points out how, like Big Brother and the Inner Party rulers
of Oceania,
[t]he radicals who conflate the activities of the west with the oppression
of the downtrodden therefore do nothing to aid those whom they purport
to prize and plenty to harm them. The claims they make to act under the
332. ORWELL, supra note 1, at 213.
333. Stewart, supra note 20.
334. Solzhenitsyn was a Russian novelist and historian who was awarded the Nobel Prize for
Literature in 1970 for exposing the world to the personal terrors he and millions of other Russians endured
in Joseph Stalin’s work camps. After fighting for his country in World War II, in 1945 he was arrested
for writing a letter in which he criticized Stalin and spent eight years in prisons and labor camps, after
which he spent three more years in enforced exile. The Gulag Archipelago is his attempt to compile a
literary-historical record of the vast system of prisons and labor camps that came into being shortly after
the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia (1917) and that underwent an enormous expansion during the rule
of Stalin (1924–53). See “Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn,” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available
at https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aleksandr-Solzhenitsyn. (last visited on Mar. 7, 2021).
335. PETERSON, GULAG, supra note 328, at xix.
336. Id.
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inspiration of pure compassion must therefore come to be regarded with
the deepest suspicion—not least by those who dare to make such claims
themselves. 337

Acknowledging the important role power plays in a totalitarian society,
Kohn writes:
Whereas tyranny, pitting the ruler and his subjects against each other, is
ultimately powerless, totalitarianism generates immense power. It is a new
sort of power, not only exceeding but different in kind from outward
coercive force. In the name of ideological necessity, totalitarian terror
dominates human beings from within, thereby mocking the appearance
and also the disappearance, the lives and the deaths of distinct and
potentially free men and women. It mocks the world that only a plurality
of free individuals can continuously renew and share with one another,
and it mocks the earth as the natural home of such beings. 338

The most important contribution Orwell made in Nineteen Eighty-Four
was to expose the world through the remarkable literary journey of Winston
Smith to the true motivations behind the totalitarian regimes that came to
power and were, thankfully, defeated in the twentieth century. Like
Solzhenitsyn, “Orwell risked his ideological commitments and his reputation
to tell us all what was truly occurring in the Soviet Union in the name of
egalitarianism and brotherhood.” 339
V.

CONCLUSION: “ANCESTRAL MEMORY” AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PROGRESS CLAUSE AND THE
ROMANTIC AUTHOR

At various points throughout Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston waxes
nostalgically when triggered to recall the few thoughts he can remember
from the peaceful childhood he experienced in the formerly free country of
England, referring to this phenomenon as “ancestral memory.” In his
ancestral memory, for example, he fondly recalls the feeling of relaxing
alone by a fire with his feet up in a place that he independently owned and
decorated:
utterly alone, utterly secure, with nobody watching you, no voice pursuing
you, no sound except the singing of the kettle and the friendly ticking of
the clock. 340

Today, we would also do well to recall our own ancestral memory,
particularly those individualistic, natural rights-based ideals that have shaped
our Constitution and our free republican form of government.
As befits writing during the long-awaited and hope-inspired arrival of
2021, I conclude by following the sage advice Orwell provided in “Notes on
337. Id. at xxii.
338. Jerome Kohn, Arendt’s Concept and Description of Totalitarianism, 69 SOCIAL RESEARCH 621,
632 (2002). Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971564.
339. PETERSON, GULAG, supra note 328, at xix.
340. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, supra note 1, at 100.
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Nationalism.” I deliver another warning that if twenty-first century
intellectuals in all disciplines fail to heed the premonitory words of our
best—and, yes, most genius—authors of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, then we are destined to witness a rapid unraveling of all the
comforts—both physical and intellectual—that are afforded by a civilized,
democratic society.
Certainly, while inequalities do, indeed, exist within the democracies of
the free Western world, they are “[t]he only systems that have produced
some modicum of wealth,” and which “emphasize above all the essential
dignity, divinity and ultimate responsibility of the individual.” 341 Contrarily,
the radical Marxist ideologies upon which the DOA and all forms of Cancel
Culture rely upon when implemented during the twentieth century have led
to twenty-five million dead in the Soviet Union, sixty million dead in Mao’s
China, two million in Cambodia’s Killing Fields, not to mention the horrors
that have occurred in Cuba and Venezuela. 342 On Marxism, Peterson
highlights the fact that
[n]o political experiment has ever been tried so widely, with so many
disparate people, in so many different countries (with such different
histories) and failed so absolutely and so catastrophically. Is it mere
ignorance (albeit of the most inexcusable kind) that allows today’s
Marxists to flaunt their continued allegiance—to present it as compassion
and care? Or is it, instead, envy of the successful, in near-infinite
proportions? Or something akin to hatred of mankind itself? 343

Without the Progress Clause of our constitution and its celebration and
provocation of the genius that lies within all of us who dare to create works
of authorship, our non-fictional fate lies with that of Winston and his
physically and mentally deprived comrades in Oceania.
Thanks to his brave authorship of Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell
reminds us—among all of the lessons within the novel—of the unequivocal
fact that great literature is, indeed, important for our moral guidance, our
sanity, our future, and most importantly, the soul and spirit of our culture.
Unlike the radical DOA advocates and Cancel [©opyright] Culture
advocates would have us think, the great literature we love and that inspires
us is written by individual authors, not by undefined group think, polyvocal
creativity, the author-function, or any of the other resentment-motivated,
collectivist regimes they have devised to vilify and replace the author.
Michael Brandon Lopez most eloquently explains the continuing
importance of individual authorship—as I am confident that our
constitutional Founders, as well as Orwell, would well agree—as follows:
Literary writers perform an important societal function, however. They are
a source of national pride and a symbol of influence around the world.
And the process by which poets and writers arrive at their literary creations
341. PETERSON, GULAG, supra note 328, at xxii.
342. Id. at xx.
343. Id.

2022

CANCEL [©OPYRIGHT] CULTURE

is an arduous task, requiring the author to go into himself and recover from
the depths of his psyche the mappings of a novel, poem, or play that
examines, mirrors, and questions the contours of society. Indeed, as
Coleridge declared, “I see, not feel, how beautiful they are . . . I may not
hope from outward forms to win, the Passion & the Life, whose Fountains
are within.” The author stands as an individual in relation to the entire
community, and through the creative process is able to distill and unfold
the spectrum of society, its errors, failings, pathos, and possibilities. One
can hardly think of England without recognizing the names of
Shakespeare, and Chaucer, or of France without thinking of Voltaire or
Sartre. Even in the United States, most individuals are apt to know the
legendary figure of Ernest Hemingway as big-game hunter, or his work
The Old Man and the Sea, or Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn. And the
enduring importance of J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye cannot be
overstated. The significance authors have to expose readers in a particular
community to each other is one of the foundational roles an author
serves—they help to explain and create fictions that we can then adapt into
our own lives, and ultimately make into our own stories. In short, literature
helps us to see one another, despite the inescapability of our own prisonhouses of perspective. 344
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The beauty of the United States Constitution and our democraticrepublican form of government, and what absolutely can never be
accomplished within any form of Marxism, socialism, or totalitarianism, is
that there is room for more—and truly inclusive and diverse—authorship to
sit with, inspire, and even critique our great canonical works. As for the
canonical and genius Nineteen Eighty-Four, hurry and read (or re-read) it . . .
before it’s canceled.

344. Lopez, supra note 62, at 178–79.

